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ABSTRACT
This Article discusses how the budget crisis, caused by the recent eco-
nomic downturn, has created a constitutional crisis with regard to the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel. The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright
required states, under the Sixth Amendment, to provide free counsel to indi-
gent criminal defendants. However, as a result of the current financial crisis,
many of those who represent the indigent have found their funding cut dra-
matically. Consequently, Gideon survives, if at all, only as a ghostly sha-
dow prowling the halls of criminal justice throughout the country.
This Article analyzes specific budget cuts from various states and how
those cuts have impacted indigent defense in this country. Further, the Ar-
ticle highlights recent litigation surrounding this issue from four states:
Florida, New York, Michigan and Kentucky. It proposes that, while litiga-
tion may be one way to reform the system, fundamental reform is necessary
in the criminal justice system. The Article offers three specific suggestions
on how to bring Gideon back to life: change the tough on crime attitude to
free up much needed funding; reform the overburdened misdemeanor sys-
tem; and implore more prosecutorial discretion in charging crimes.
Gideon's Ghost
"We will not put a price tag upon constitutional rights."'
INTRODUCTION 2
When Clarence Earl Gideon sat down to write a letter to the United
States Supreme Court, he had no idea of the implications that would fol-
low.' Mr. Gideon was merely upset because he had asked for a lawyer to
represent him in his criminal trial, and the judge had refused his request.'
That letter, when read by the Justices, began one of the most storied cases in
Supreme Court history. In this landmark case, the United States Supreme
Court announced that the states were required to provide free counsel to
indigent criminal defendants.'
Gideon was a tall order to fill when it was announced, and recent bud-
getary crises have only made the situation worse.' Traditionally over-
worked and underpaid, public defenders have been the victims of steep
budget cuts with the onslaught of the financial crisis, pushing their offices to
the breaking point.' Caught between ethical obligations to their clients and
the courts, many public defender offices have filed suit, asking for relief.
The real victims in this struggle, however, are indigent and unrepresented
defendants.'
1. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 380, n.I1 (1969) (quoting State ex rel. Freden-
berg v. Byrne, 123 N.W.2d 305, 310 (Wis. 1963)).
2. Many of the citations to various studies and research regarding the right to coun-
sel were originally derived from THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/managelfile/1 39.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED].
3. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 7-10 (1964).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. Id. at 344. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause required
this result. Id. at 342.
6. See infra Section IV.A.
7. Bill Rankin, Public Defender System in Crisis Again, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Nov. 16, 2007, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseup
dates/georgia I 65?opendocument; see also, Renee Michelle Harris, Public Defender's Office
at "Breaking Point," SOUTH FLORIDA TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, available at http://www.sfl
times.com/index2.php?option=com content&dopdfl 1&id=236I.
8. See Vidhya K. Reddy, Indigent Defense Reform: The Role of Systemic Litigation
in Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 1279185, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1279185.
9. See Sonia Y. Lee, OC's PD's Feeling The Squeeze-The Right To Counsel: In
Light of Budget Cuts, Can the Orange County Office of the Public Defender Provide Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel?, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1895, 1897(1996) ("This lack of funding
for public defenders is directly responsible for the perceived dumping problem: the less
money supplied to the office, the less investigative and medical expert support, the fewer
public defenders employed, and hence the fewer public defenders available for indigent
defense. Consequently, indigent defendants receive inadequate assistance of counsel."); see
also Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L.
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This Article analyzes the current constitutional crisis of the right to
counsel and how the budget crisis has exacerbated the problem. The Article
discusses some specific cuts and how they have affected the right to coun-
sel. The Article also discusses litigation in four states that has been brought
to help relieve the problems. It proposes that, while litigation may be one
way to reform the system, fundamental reform is necessary in the criminal
justice system if any real changes are to be made. The Article recommends
three specific suggestions that will generate more money for states and open
up more time for those who represent the indigent defendants: abandoning
the tough on crime mentality, reforming the misdemeanor system, and en-
couraging more prosecutorial discretion.
I. How GIDEON CAME TO BE
The seeds of Gideon began to sprout when the United States Supreme
Court announced in Powell v. Alabamao that a state must appoint counsel,
free of charge, to an indigent defendant in a capital case." The Court
seemed poised to continue down that path until it came to an abrupt halt in
Betts v. Brady.12 In this puzzling opinion, the Court refused to extend the
Powell decision, holding that the states were not required to provide counsel
in any non-capital case because it would be too burdensome for the states.' 3
The Court conceded that a trial conducted without counsel may indeed be
unfair, but it concluded there should not be a blanket requirement of counsel
because not every charge necessitated representation by an attorney. 4 In
fact, the Court was fearful that requiring the States to provide counsel would
lead the country down a slippery slope in which counsel would have to be
provided in "[c]harges of small crimes" and even "civil cases involving
property."" In essence, the Betts majority opined that "counsel [was] not a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial."'" In dissent, Justice Black force-
fully exclaimed that "[a] practice cannot be reconciled with 'common and
REv. 1433, 1437 (1999) (lack of adequate funding for indigent defense voids the purpose of
the adversarial system); Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for
Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 Mo. L. REV.
931, 933 (2010) (arguing that the systemic problem of reduction in funds decreases the pos-
sibility of protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction).
10. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11. Id. at 7 1.
12. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Betts raised the very specific question of whether the
states should be required to provide free counsel. See id. at 462. This was a controversial
topic at the time because it raised a federalism and states' rights issue.
13. See id. at 472-73.
14. Id. at 473.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 471.
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fundamental ideas of fairness and right,' which subjects innocent men to
increased dangers of conviction merely because of their poverty.""
A. The Time for Change Had Come
In 1963, as civil rights leaders marched on Washington, the Supreme
Court announced one of its most far-reaching opinions. Gideon v. Wain-
wright" changed the landscape of the American justice system, announcing
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a fundamental right, and the
states were required, under the due process clause, to provide free counsel
to all indigent defendants." The Court explicitly overruled Betts, and Jus-
tice Black was able to turn his Betts dissent into a unanimous majority opi-
nion.20 The Court remanded the case to the Florida trial court, where Mr.
Gideon was provided with an attorney.2' Interestingly enough, Mr. Gideon
was acquitted of the charges during his second trial.22 This outcome pro-
vided a powerful illustration of the difference between having an attorney-
and not having an attorney-in a criminal case.
As time went on, the Court gradually expanded the right to free coun-
sel to any defendant who is actually imprisoned, including those charged
with misdemeanors.23 The Court has made it clear that actual imprisonment
is the line drawn in the sand, not a mere possibility of imprisonment.24 Ju-
veniles are also entitled to counsel,25 and defendants appealing their cases
17. Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
18. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
19. Id. at 343-44. The Court also held that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded
by the first eight amendments against federal action were also protected against state action
by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 343.
20. Id. at 342 ("We think the Court in Betts was wrong ... in concluding that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.").
21. See LEWIS, supra note 3, at 223-38. The local attorney appointed to represent
Gideon was able to attack the star witness for the prosecution and provide reasonable doubt
for the jury. Id. at 237-38.
22. Id.; Gideon v. Wainwright 153 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1963).
23. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that "no person may
be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he
was represented by counsel at his trial").
24. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). But see Alabama v. Shelton, 535
U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (holding that counsel must be provided in a case where a suspended
sentence is imposed). In Shelton, the Court reasoned that if a prison term is activated by a
probation violation, the time being served in prison actually goes to the original offense, not
the probation violation. Therefore, the defendant should have been given counsel in the
original proceeding related to the original offense. Id. at 662.
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1967). This decision established, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, that "[a]s a component part of a fair hearing required by due process
... notice of the right to counsel should be required at all [juvenile delinquency proceedings]
and counsel provided upon request when the family is financially unable to employ counsel."
Id. at 39.
Summer] 345
Michigan State Law Review
are entitled to an attorney for their first appeal as a matter of right.26 Of
course, these are the minimum guarantees required; each state is free to go
above and beyond the national standard in providing counsel-and many
do. 27
B. Any Warm Body Will Do
Once the right to counsel was established, the logical question that fol-
lowed was what kind of counsel is one entitled to? Will any warm body do?
Can an indigent person pick his or her counsel? 28 The Court began to ad-
dress these questions in McMann v. Richardson,29 when it held that the right
to counsel means the right to the "effective assistance of counsel.""o In
many ways, however, that statement just raised more questions. What does
effective assistance of counsel mean? How bad does the attorney's perfor-
mance have to be before it is considered ineffective?
The Court attempted to clarify those questions when it announced
Strickland v. Washington." In what has come to be known as a two-prong
test, Strickland announced that a defendant must show: first, that his trial
attorney's performance was deficient;32 and second, that that performance
prejudiced the outcome of the trial." When evaluating the first prong re-
garding deficient performance, a "defendant must show that counsel's re-
presentation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."34 The
Court made it clear that this was not an easy standard to meet by granting "a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance."" The defendant must show that coun-
26. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963) (holding equal protection
requires indigent defendants to be given the benefit of counsel on their first matter of right
appeal). Interestingly enough, the Douglas decision was handed down the same day as
Gideon. Id; Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
27. For example, in Florida, like many other states, the rules of Criminal Procedure
require that counsel be provided in all cases where there is a possibility of imprisonment, not
merely actual imprisonment. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111 (b)(1).
28. Over the years, the courts have easily dispelled the idea that you may be able to
choose your counsel. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) ("[W]hile
the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the
Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate
for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be
represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.") (citation omitted). Interestingly enough,
Gideon did just that at retrial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1963).
29. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
30. Id. at 771 n.14 (emphasis added).
31. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
32. Id. at 688.
33. Id. at 692.
34. Id. at 688.
35. Id. at 689.
[Vol. 2010:341346
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sel's actions were not mere strategy; 6 and over the years, courts have dis-
missed many ineffective assistance claims on the basis that the counsel's
questioned action should be considered trial strategy."
Furthermore, even if the defendant is lucky enough to prove the first
prong, he must then overcome a second hurdle by establishing prejudice."
Even if the error was blatant and unreasonable, if there was no effect on the
outcome of the trial, then the ineffective assistance claim must fail." The
defendant has the ultimate burden of showing that there was a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."40 This is a difficult standard to
prove. The prejudicial standard has proven so insurmountable, in fact, that
a sleeping counsel may not be enough to overcome it.4 1 It has been argued
that the Strickland opinion has done more to undermine Gideon than any-
thing.42 With such a hard burden to overcome in proving ineffective assis-
36. Id. at 689-90 (explaining that "[t]here are countless ways to provide effective
assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a
particular client in the same way" (citing Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 343 (1983))).
37. Justice Marshall predicted this possibility when Strickland was announced. Id
at 715 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be disman-
tled by good defense counsel. On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a re-
viewing court confidently to ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would
have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.");
see also Klein, supra note 9, at 1456-59 (explaining that courts are willing to say that most
any decision by an attorney is "strategic," thereby defeating the first prong of Strickland).
38. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
39. Id. at 694.
40. Id.
41. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 382 n.28 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
court does not presume prejudice from the mere fact that counsel was sleeping, but must
apply test); see also McFarland v. Texas, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997) (denying review of the de-
fendant's capital conviction even though his attorney was sleeping at trial); Burnett v. Col-
lins, 982 F.2d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that counsel was per se inef-
fective because of the alcohol abuse and that the defendant had failed to show that counsel
was impaired during trial due to alcohol abuse); People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal.
1989) (counsel not ineffective even though he was notorious alcoholic who was arrested on
his way to hearing); Jeffery L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, And Drowsiness: The Constitu-
tional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75
NEB. L. REv. 425,445-60 (1996). But see Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1996)
("Prejudice is inherent [in this case] because unconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to
no counsel at all." (quoting Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984)));
James M. Donovan, Burdine v. Johnson-To Sleep, Perchance to Get a New Trial: Pre-
sumed Prejudice Arising from Sleeping Counsel, 47 LoY. L. REv. 1585, 1589 (2001) (dis-
cussing all cases regarding sleeping counsel).
42. See Klein, supra note 9, at 1446, 1467 (discussing how the Strickland standard
has damaged the right to counsel); see also, Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor:
Indigent Defense and Effective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIs L.J. 435, 441 (2004) (arguing that
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tance of counsel, the courts have created an "any warm body will do" atti-
tude toward the representation of criminal defendants.43 Where an indigent
defendant's counsel does next to nothing, the Strickland standard does little
to help him, a result that seems squarely inconsistent with the intent of the
Gideon decision.'
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GIDEON AND ITS FAILURE FROM THE START
Though the state of indigent defense is arguably worse than ever, the
situation described in this Article is scarcely new. The indigent defense
system has practically been in crisis since it began.45 Many studies con-
ducted before the publication of Justice Denied" also came to the same
conclusion that the state of indigent defense was woefully inadequate.47
Defenders have traditionally faced funding problems, as well as public im-
age issues.
A. Different Models for Providing Indigent Defense
To fully comprehend the issues faced by indigent defense providers, it
is necessary to understand the different indigent defense models employed
throughout the United States. There are three general models: 1) public
defender systems; 2) assigned counsel; and 3) contract counsel.48 In a pub-
lic defender model, there are essentially firms of attorneys whose sole prac-
tice focuses on defending the indigent.49 These firms are funded by either
the state or the county.50 In contrast, assigned counsel models employ pri-
vate attorneys on a case by case basis, and the attorneys are either paid by
the Strickland standard fails to insure more than minimum levels of competency in attor-
neys).
43. See Klein, supra note 9, at 1467.
44. See Weaver, supra note 42, at 443-45 (explaining that when counsel fails to act,
he leaves no record of error, and therefore the Strickland standard is not met).
45. See, e.g., A SPECIAL COMM. OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y.C. &
THE NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 5, 40-45
(1959) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED]; LEE SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE
POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS: A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT 7-10
(1965).
46. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2.
47. See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, supra note 45, which actually began before Gideon was
announced, and Robert B. von Mehren, Introduction to EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED,
supra note 45, at 13-17, which was a product of a special committee of the Association of
The Bar of the City of New York and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and
completed in 1959.
48. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 53.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 54.
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the hour or by the case." Additionally, in states with a public defender
model, private attorneys are also sometimes used as "conflict counsel,"S2
i.e., in a situation where the public defender's office cannot represent a de-
fendant because it would be a conflict of interest, the state will appoint a
private attorney." Finally, in what might be considered a hybrid of the pub-
lic defender and assigned counsel models, some states employ a contract
counsel approach.54 In those states, attorneys are contracted to handle a
certain number of cases per year, and are paid either a general stipend or on
a case-by-case basis by the state."
B. Funding
Historically, the biggest obstacle faced by providers of indigent repre-
sentation has been a lack of money.56 When Gideon was decided, there
were about 150,000 defendants charged with felonies who needed represen-
tation." One study estimated the cost for such representation at $25 mil-
lion." Gradually, after Gideon, funding for indigent representation did in-
crease, slightly, but there was still not a large amount of money spent in this
area." In 1985, "criminal justice activities" were "less than 3% of all gov-
ernment spending,"60 and only about 1.5% of that 3% was spent on indigent
defense." Put another way, states spent, on average, less than one half of
51. Id. at 53.
52. Id. Conflict counsel is assigned when the public defender's office may have a
conflict in representing the defendant, for example if one of the co-defendants is already
represented by the public defender's office. See, e.g., Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350 (Ga.
2010).
53. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 53. In Florida, the state has created a separate
system of public defenders that are known as Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel.
The state found it would be more cost efficient to employ full-time conflict attorneys, rather
than appoint them on a contract basis. There have been challenges to this system, mostly by
the private bar, who are, coincidentally, the attorneys no longer getting appointments from
the judges. See Crist v. Fla. Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, 978 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 2008).
The Florida Supreme Court found this legislative creation was not unconstitutional because
these Conflict Counsel are not public defenders, and therefore do not need to be elected
under the Florida Constitution. Id. at 148.
54. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 53.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 50.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 51.
59. Id. at 52.
60. Id.; see RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, THE INDIGENT DEFENSE
CRISIS (1993). This report was prepared by Professor Klein and Mr. Spangenberg for the
American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice Ad Hoc Committee on the Indigent
Defense Crisis.
61. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 52.
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one percent of their budgets on indigent defense. By 1990, that number had
not increased.62
Further exacerbating the problem is the issue of who actually funds
the offices: the states or the counties." Most studies have found that indi-
gent defense funding is much more effective when it comes primarily from
the state.' This prevents inequities in the different jurisdictions that can
occur from the larger population concentrations in bigger cities." Fortu-
nately, state funding-versus local funding-of indigent defense is on the
rise.66  Unfortunately, state budgets are facing numerous cuts, as is ex-
plained further in this Article.
C. Not Taken Seriously
Another problem encountered by those who provide indigent represen-
tation is a lack of respect from clients and peers. Many clients do not take
their attorneys seriously, writing them off as brand-new attorneys, ignorant
at worst and inexperienced at best. These attorneys are considered the step-
children6 1 of the justice system and are looked upon as biding their time
62. KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 60, at 1. Most of the justice system budget
seems to go to the police (42.8%) and corrections (33.6%). Id. Ironically, attorneys who
represent capital defendants are some of the lowest paid attorneys. Id. at 7. One study con-
cluded that counsel providing representation to capital clients in Virginia were compensated
at an average rate of $13.19 an hour, after taking into account all expenses. Id
63. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 54. Most states now fund these offices, with
counties supplementing the budget. Id. at 53. The state fully funds the cost of its indigent
defense in twenty-eight states: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Id. at 54. More
than 50% of the funding in Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and South Carolina comes from the
state-with the slack being taken up by the individual county. Id. The county funds more
than 50% of the costs for indigent defense in 16 states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio,
South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. Id. Pennsylvania and Utah are the only two states
where all the funding for indigent defense comes from the individual county. Id. at 53. State
funding has been found to be more effective in most studies. Id. at 54-55.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 45, at 149; see also Reddy, supra note 8, at 4 n.19
(discussing how the attorneys that were appointed to indigent defendants "tended to be
young, inexperienced, and had few resources with which to defend. Moreover, the often
improvised system of appointing counsel resulted in little scrutiny of qualifications. In fact,
appointments often depended on which attorneys happened to be present at the courthouse
when a prisoner was arraigned."); Nancy Albert-Goldberg & Marshall J. Hartman, The Pub-
lic Defender In America, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 67, 80 (William F. McDonald ed., 1983)
("Perhaps in part due to popular sentiment, legal defense systems have long been the step-
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Gideon's Ghost
until they can get a "real job.""8 Furthermore, even other attorneys scorn
public defenders, thinking of them as doing the job somebody else has to
do. Unfortunately, some of these accusations have some truth to them. The
low salaries do tend to attract attorneys right out of law school, eager to get
"trial experience."" Further, there is a high turnover rate in most public
defender offices." However, not all of those who represent the indigent
follow that stereotype. There are many committed public servants who
spend decades representing indigent defendants. Many have a passion for
their work and for the notion that all citizens have a right to counsel." As
the following section describes, however, even those dedicated, experienced
attorneys face formidable obstacles.
III. GIDEON IN TODAY'S WORLD
Jay Kolsky is an assistant public defender for the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Florida, which handles the state criminal cases in Miami-Dade
County.72 Mr. Kolsky has thirty-eight years of experience as an attorney,
having worked as a prosecutor and a private criminal defense attorney.73 In
2008-09 fiscal year, Mr. Kolsky had a total caseload of 778 cases.74 Mr.
Kolsky usually becomes aware of a new case assignment when the client's
arraignment is set, which is usually about three weeks after the defendant
has been arrested." Because arraignment is the first time Mr. Kolsky has
child of the criminal justice system in America; they have been said to suffer from financial
anemia.").
68. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 45, at 149.
69. Klein, supra note 9, at 1474 (discussing how the low salary and high caseloads
of public defenders make it difficult to attract quality attorneys).
70. See, e.g., Aaron Bailey, High Turnover Plagues Public Defenders: Increasing
Caseloads, Student Loan Debt Put Some Missouri Lawyers in a Bind, ST. JOSEPH NEWS-
PRESS, July 9 2007, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/DefenseUp
dates/Michigan036 (discussing how one Missouri Public Defender's office has close to a
20% turnover rate).
71. See generally MOSTELLER, supra note 9 (discussing the author's life at the public
defender's office and his experience with the Innocence project).
72. Affidavit of Jay Kolsky at 1, State v. Bowens, No. F09-019364 (11th Fla. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 3, 2009), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWork
load/Mo to Withdraw Exhibit A.pdf [hereinafter Affidavit of Jay Kolsky]. Mr. Kolsky
filed this affidavit in support of his Motion to Withdraw, which is the subject of litigation
discussed infra, section V.A. Public defenders in PD-I I represent the indigent defendants in
the state courts located in Miami-Dade County, Florida.
73. Id. at 1.
74. Assistant Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw and to Declare Section
27.5303(l)(d), Florida Statutes, Unconstitutional at 4, State v. Bowens, No. F09-019364
(11th Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 2009) available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWork
load/Filed 08-03-09_MotiontoWithdraw.pdf [hereinafter Assistant Public Defender's
Motion to Withdraw].
75. Id.
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received the case, if the State makes a plea offer to his client at arraignment,
Mr. Kolsky cannot intelligently offer any legal advice, other than the gener-
al procedures in Florida criminal courts." Additionally, Mr. Kolsky cannot
even discuss these options and procedures in private with his client, as most
of these conversations occur while his client is "handcuffed to other defen-
dants in the jury box.""
If a plea offer is not accepted at arraignment, Mr. Kolsky's cursory re-
view of the file usually does not begin until at least four to five weeks after
arraignment." Mr. Kolsky gives up his lunch hour so that he can visit his
clients who are in custody. 9 Many times, this is the only interview with his
client before the case is resolved, either by a plea or going to trial.so Be-
cause Mr. Kolsky has to give priority to his in-custody clients, he rarely gets
to interview his out-of-custody clients in person."' He almost never sets a
deposition in an out-of-custody case because it would mean delaying a de-
position in one of his in-custody clients' cases.82
Mr. Kolsky seldom visits a crime scene, and he files form motions on
behalf of his clients because he does not have time to research the specifics
of his clients' cases. He rarely submits requests for special jury instructions
in writing. He makes every attempt not to file continuances in his cases
because, not only does it waive his client's right to a speedy trial, it also
prevents him from moving cases off his pending case list.83 If one of his
out-of-custody client's case goes to trial, Mr. Kolsky's sole trial preparation
is "reading the [arrest affidavit], perhaps an offense incident report, and, at
best, a brief conversation with the client, often in the hallway outside the
courtroom."' If the client is found guilty, Mr. Kolsky almost never has the
time to prepare a mitigation package to present to court at sentencing."
Mr. Kolsky's situation is just an example of what many of those who
represent the indigent are currently facing. Due to budget cuts, many Public
Defenders' offices have been forced to furlough" attorneys, if not outright
lay them off." And the lucky ones who get to keep their jobs are thus faced
76. Affidavit of Jay Kolsky, supra note 72, at 3.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 4.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 4-5.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 6.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id.
86. See Lee, supra note 9, at 1915-16 (discussing the bankruptcy of Orange County,
California, and how that caused many attorneys to leave and then the lack of funds prevented
new hires).
87. Lawyers for the Poor Facing Layoffs, As Hard Times Hit Courts, Advocates Say
Cuts Could Cost More in Long Run, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 15, 2009, available at
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with overflowing case loads." This lack of funding is even more critical
when the cuts are not doled out proportionately, and the prosecutors' offices
do not feel the cuts as deeply." Additionally, many attorneys find them-
selves facing situations that make it very difficult to comply with the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct."o This section will address each of these
issues in turn.
A. Funding Has Gone the Wrong Way
As discussed above, funding has always been a problem for indigent
defense, but today the problem has reached epic proportions. With the re-
cent recession, many legislatures have been forced to cut billions of dollars
from their budgets.9' For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2010, forty-six
states will face budget shortfalls.9 2 To make up these shortfalls, states have
slashed funding to continue to operate; and when states go chopping, those
who represent indigent defendants are usually at the top of the chopping
block.
For example, in Georgia's Northern Judicial Circuit, which comprises
five counties, the conflict counsel's budget was reduced from $129,166.00
http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id/31374504/ ("Lawyers for the poor, who say they already are
stretched to the breaking point by huge caseloads and dwindling staff, face layoffs across the
country as local governments slash spending in these hard economic times.").
88. Jay Weiner, A Stark Contrast in Courts: Upstairs, The Pricey Lawyer-filled
Coleman-Franken Trial; Downstairs, an Overworked Public Defender, MINN. POST, Feb. 19
2009, http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2009/02/19/6836/a-starkcontrast in-courts up
stairs the priceylawyer-filledcoleman-frankentrialdownstairs anoverworkedjrublic_
defender.
89. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 61. This disproportionate funding has
become a real problem in many states and gives-at least the perception of-an unfair ad-
vantage to the prosecutors. But see, Missy Diaz, Salaries Don't do Justice, State Measure
Would Help Prosecutors, Public Defenders Make Ends Meet, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 13,
2006, at C2 (discussing how both the public defenders and prosecutors lack funding in Flori-
da).
90. The amount of litigation regarding the overload of cases affect on moral and
ethical obligations can be found in almost every state, some of which will be discussed in
more detail infra Section IV. This Article does not purport to cover all of the litigation, and
will only show some as examples. See, e.g., Public Defender v. Florida, 34 So. 3d 2 (Fla.
2010); Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 2010) (concerning habeas petition in death penalty
case for ineffective counsel); Duncan v. Michigan, 780 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2010); Hurrell-
Harring v. New York, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). For more cases see Reddy,
supra note 8, at 38-54 (cataloging all recent relevant cases in an Appendix).
91. ELIZABETH MCNICHOL ET. AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES
CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION'S IMPACT (2010), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-
08sfp.pdf. According to this study, the fiscal year 2011 gaps total $125 billion. The authors
believe this will likely grow and could reach $140 billion for fiscal year 2012. See id
92. Id.
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to a mere $37,152.00 in 2009, a more than 70% decrease in funding.9 3 Fur-
ther, the budget cuts in Georgia forced the Georgia Public Defender Stan-
dards Council to lay off forty-one employees.94 In Kentucky, the legislature
cut $2.3 million from the indigent defense budget in 2008," and in Minne-
sota, the legislature cut $4 million from the Board of Public Defense's
Budget in 2009.96
Florida's indigent defense systems have seen particularly steep budget
cuts.97 In Florida's Ninth Judicial Circuit alone, which includes Orange and
Osceola Counties,9 8 the criminal justice system experienced budget reduc-
tions of $3 million in 2008.9 In Miami-Dade County, the Public Defender
of the Eleventh Circuit saw a decrease of over $1.5 million from its 2007-08
to its 2008-09 budget.'oo In two years, Miami-Dade had a 14% reduction in
funds. 'o
When politicians make decisions about whether to cut teachers or in-
digent defense, political consideration dictate their choice.'02 The public is
much more likely to support a politician when that politician can tell the
public that he or she is avoiding cuts to emergency workers by taking mon-
ey away from criminals. Conversely, a politician is much less likely to suf-
fer any political consequences for cutting the public defender's budget.
93. Bill Rankin, Lawyerless Defendants File Lawsuit, ATLANTA J. CONsT., Apr. 8,
2009, available at http://www.ajc.com/services/content/printedition/2009/04/08/defender
0408.html. The lawsuit explained here will be discussed infra.
94. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 60.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Carlos J. Martinez, Overview of Public Defender's Litigation to Protect Individ-
uals' Right to Counsel, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NAT'L SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE:
LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD 2000-2010 (Feb. 18-19 2010) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF
FLORIDA] (discussing the "$3.8 million (14%) in budget cuts to PD-Il the last 2 years").
98. The city of Orlando, Florida is located in Orange County.
99. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 60. This included both the public defender and
the prosecutor. Id.
100. See Response to Requests for Information in Court's February 26, 2009 Order at
6, No. 3D08-2272 & 3D08-2537, available at http://www.pdmiami.comiExcessiveWork
load/Response toCourts Request for Information.pdf.
101. OVERVIEW OF FLORIDA, supra note 97.
102. Lee, supra note 9, at 1923-24 & n.201 ("Politicians receive 'Brownie points' for
making and enforcing laws and for adding more police, but none for funding the defense.
This imbalance simultaneously slows down the system and fuels appeals based upon the
argument of ineffective assistance of counsel." (quoting Rhonda Bodfield, Help Sought for
Public Defenders, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 4, 1996, at IC)).
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B. Overwhelming Number of Cases'o3
Another problem facing indigent defense attorneys is the increasing
number of cases versus the decreasing number of attorneys representing the
indigent, which is also a result of budget cuts.'" A large cause of this in-
creased workload is the cutting of positions and failure of the state or county
to fund contracts.'o The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Jus-
tice Standards and Goals has stated that the maximum caseload for trial
level public defenders should be no more than 150 felony cases per year,
200 juvenile cases per year, or 400 misdemeanor cases per year."06 The
rules go on to say that "[m]ixed caseloads exceeding 363 cases per year
have been found to be excessive."' In a 2007 study, the Department of
Justice found that more than 60% of state public defense programs and
county offices "exceeded the nationally recommended felony caseload stan-
dard."' 0
103. This Article examines only a snapshot of the overburdened public defenders'
offices across the country and does not purport to discuss all of the offices in crisis.
104. Klein, supra note 9, at 1474. Professor Klein posits that the decreasing number
of those who are willing to represent the indigent is a direct result of Strickland. See id. at
1474-75. Although Justice O'Connor's opinion was an attempt to protect those attorneys,
says Klein, it actually drives people away from indigent defense. Id. If the opinion had
created a higher standard, it would have also "required more funding for the additional time
the assigned counsel would have had to devote to each case. The work, therefore, would
become more attractive." Id. at 1475 (emphasis omitted). Professor Klein goes on to say
that "attorneys who are expected to work so few hours on a case lose respect for themselves
and their work, and fewer new lawyers wish to join their ranks." Id. It must also be noted
that the economy itself has put defendants in a worse financial state, enabling more to qualify
as indigent, which has also increased the caseloads of public defenders. See Monica Davey,
In Missouri, State Budget Problems Take Toll on Lawyers for the Indigent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2010, at A15.
105. Kate Leckie, Court Ruling to Increase Public Defenders' Caseload, FREDERICK
NEWS POST, May 29, 2010, available at http://www.fredericknewspost.com
/sections/news/display.htm?storyid=105545 (quoting Maryland Public Defender Paul B.
DeWolfe, Jr.: "Our caseloads are increasing as budgets are being cut. But we'll find a way to
find a resolution. We'll all adjust as best as we can.").
106. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, TASK
FORCE ON COURTS, CHAPTER 13, THE DEFENSE (1973), available at
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender Standards/Standards For TheDefense. The
writers of JUSTICE DENIED caution the use of these numbers because there was never any
empirical evidence shown why these numbers were chosen and the standards were written
over thirty-five years ago. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 66. The National Right to
Counsel Committee posits that these numbers are actually very large because the criminal
law has become much more complicated and time consuming. Id.
107. John Delaney, DPA Budget Cuts, KY. BENCH & B., Mar. 2009, at 13.
108. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF PUB. DEFENDERS OFFICES
(2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/Plenary4/Workshops/Works
hop4F/DBanks 1 -BJSIndigentDef-CompatibilityMode.pdf.
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To point out some specific examples, attorneys who work for the De-
partment of Public Advocacy in Kentucky are facing caseloads close to 40%
above the national standards.'" Even though the number of defendants has
risen dramatically in the last decade, the number of attorneys has not."o The
National Association of Criminal Defense published a report showing that
the number of misdemeanor cases has increased from five million cases in
1972, to over 10.2 million in 2006, while the number of public defense at-
torneys overall has decreased.'" In Atlanta, for example, the Atlanta City
Public Defender Office had twenty lawyers in 2007. Those twenty lawyers,
who handled the "low level city court cases," had a caseload of about
21,000 cases." 2 This averages out to 1,050 cases per attorney."' Budget
cuts hit that office hard, and the director had to lay off six lawyers. Addi-
tionally, four other attorneys resigned, so the director was left with ten at-
torneys to handle what she estimated would be about 24,000 cases that next
year."4 This equated to "2,400 per attorney, or six times the national stan-
dards.""' And in Florida, one assistant public defender (APD) was assigned
a total of 778 cases for the fiscal year of 2008-09."' According to his calcu-
lations, this allowed him a mere three hours a year to spend on each case."'
In Michigan, where funding of its indigent defense ranks forty-fourth
out of the fifty states,"' it was reported that some contract attorneys had an
109. Delaney, supra note 107. In the Kentucky DPA office, the caseload per attorney
averaged 544 cases in Fiscal Year 2008. Id. at 14. This office is facing even more budget
cuts, which will raise the caseload count even further.
110. In 2000, the Kentucky DPA handled 97,818 cases. In the fiscal year 2007, that
number grew to 148,518, a more than 50% increase. See Petition for Declaratory Judgment
at 11, Lewis v. Hollenbach, available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/publiclPD-
KY-0001-0001.pdf.
111. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, ET. AL, NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S MISDEMEANOR COURT 11 (Apr.
2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemean
or/$FILE/Report.pdf [hereinafter MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE].
112. Id. at 27.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Assistant Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw, supra note 74, at 4. This
particular Assistant Public Defender, Mr. Jay Kolsky, filed a Motion to Withdraw based on
his caseload, which was granted, although that motion was overturned by Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal. See discussion supra in Section IV.
117. Id. at 5.
118. Ed Brayton, State Slammed in Report Detailing Public Defender Deficiencies,
THE MICH. MESSENGER, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://michiganmessenger.com/13476
/state-slammed-in-report-detailing-public-defender-deficiencies (citing Nat'l Legal Aid &
Defender Ass'n, Executive Summary, in A RACE TO THE BOTTOM-SPEED & SAVINGS OVER
DUE PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS i, i (June 2008), available at
http://www.mynlada.org/michigan/michigan-report execsum.pdf, [hereinafter RACE TO THE
BOTTOM]).
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average of 746 cases per attorney."'9 Even more alarming, a study con-
ducted by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association found that the
Misdemeanor Defender Professional Corporation, which maintains a con-
tract with the City of Detroit to represent indigent defendants, had case
loads 500-600% greater than the standard set by the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.'20 That office han-
dles between 12,000 and 14,000 cases a year-with just five part-time at-
torneys and a handful of law students.12 ' Dividing the number of cases by
each attorney, that comes out to between 2,400-2,800 cases per year, per
attorney.12  The authors of the study then went on to surmise that if each of
those attorneys worked 75% of their time on these cases (note that these are
part-time attorneys who, presumably, have other cases), these attorneys
spend only thirty-two minutes per case.123
Only nine states have a formal policy regarding the maximum casel-
oad number for public defenders.124 Of those nine, only two have a man-
dated state law that actually codifies the requirement.125 Furthermore, two
of the state programs that have caseload limits, Colorado and Wisconsin,
have no authority to refuse appointments due to caseload, effectively nulli-
fying the limit.'26 Interestingly enough, only one quarter of all cases re-
ceived by state public defender programs are felony non-capital cases.'27
Furthermore, in county-funded offices, more than 50% of the cases were
misdemeanors.128 This amount went down significantly, however, in state
programs with caseload limits or the ability to refuse cases.129 In fact, attor-
119. See Complaint at 36, Duncan v. Michigan, No. 112997 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22,
2007), available at http://www.sado.org/fees/duncan_v_state.pdf. It must be remembered
that these attorneys represent other clients; the cases referred to here are only the contracts
they are given from the court.
120. RACE TO THE BOTrOM, supra note 118, at 23.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CENSUS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007-STATISTICAL TABLES 6 (2007),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf [hereinafter 2007 CENSUS]. The states
are Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 111, at 26-28 (discuss-
ing how the misdemeanor indigent defenders take the brunt of budget shortages).
128. 2007 CENSUS, supra note 124, at 13.
129. Id. at 16. Some jurisdictions have the ability to refuse to take on more misde-
meanor cases. See id.
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neys have almost half the number of misdemeanor cases in programs where
they have the ability to refuse cases or where there are caseload limits.13o
Another source of case overload stems from personnel decision-
making in the public defenders offices themselves. Some offices are mak-
ing the choice not to fill vacancies in an effort to save money and "spread
the wealth." 3 ' These offices have chosen to redistribute their allocation of
funds rather than pay a new attorney.'32 These funds may go to a raise for a
senior attorney or to help fund investigatory costs. In an era of continued
budget cuts, many of these workers are seeing their health care costs rise
and have not seen more than a cost of living increase-and most are lucky
to get that-in years. As such, offices have had to be creative with their
financing to keep high quality attorneys.
C. Ethical Implications
Another problem with these burgeoning caseloads is the inability of
many public defenders to meet the needs of their clients under the ethical
rules."' Among others, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 requires
that a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.'34 Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2 requires that an attorney consult with his
client to determine the "objectives of representation.""' Furthermore, Rule
130. Id. at 12. Programs that allow limits or refusals have approximately 140 cases
per attorney, while programs without limits have close to 275. The numbers were about the
same, however, with regard to felony, non-capital cases. Id.
131. Florida v. Pub. Defender, 12 So. 3d 798, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (discuss-
ing how the Miami-Dade County Public Defender, Bennett H. Brummer, "acknowledged that
he opted to increase employee salaries rather than hire additional staff").
132. Id
133. See Roberta G. Mandel, The Appointment of Counsel to Indigent Defendants is
Not Enough: Budget Cuts Render the Right to Counsel Virtually Meaningless, 83 FLA B.J. 43
(2009). This Article does not examine all the ethical implications facing those who represent
the indigent, but merely touches on some of the largest challenges.
134. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2006). In full, the rule reads: "RULE
1.1 Competence: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation." Id.
135. Id. R. 1.2. The rule requires:
Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer:
(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall con-
sult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may
take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a mat-
ter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consul-
tation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify.
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1.3 requires that a lawyer act with "diligence and promptness in
representing a client."'36 Comment 2 of that rule states that a lawyer's ca-
seload "must be controlled so that each matter may be handled competent-
ly."'37 Rule 1.4 requires the attorney to keep the client reasonably in-
formed.' Additionally, Rule 5.1 addresses the ethical responsibilities of a
lawyer supervising a public defender.' This rule requires supervisors to
ensure that the attorneys under them are following all of these rules and
providing competent representation.140
If an attorney is averaging no more than thirty-two minutes per client,
as the contract attorneys in Detroit,141 it is simply impossible to meet the
needs of each defendant. To be diligent, as required by Rule 1.3, cases must
(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment,
does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities.
(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasona-
ble under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal con-
sequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or as-
sist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.
Id.
136. Id. R. 1.3 (describing the requirement of diligence).
137. Id. R. 1.3, cmt. 2; see also ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006) (citing id.).
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3).
139. Id. R. 5.1. The rule requires that:
Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers:
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other
lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make rea-
sonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable as-
surance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law
firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority
over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its conse-
quences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial ac-
tion.
Id.
140. Id. R 5.1(b).
141. RACE TO THE BoTroM, supra note 118, at 23.
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be investigated. This includes talking to witnesses and arresting officers, as
well as reading police reports and taking depositions. 4 2 Cases need to be
evaluated for weaknesses and, if found, motions to suppress or dismiss need
to be filed.'43 This requires legal research and drafting and arguing motions.
Additionally, attorneys must consult with their clients to discuss the repre-
sentation under Rule 1.2 and keep the client informed of the case under
Rule 1.4. To accomplish all of this in thirty-two minutes per case would be
a tall order-to do it for 2,400 reported cases a year would appear to be
impossible.'"
D. Disproportionate Funding
When discussing funding, another issue that must be raised is the dis-
parity in many states between the funding of counsel to represent indigent
defendants and the offices that prosecute those defendants.145 This lack of
parity violates number eight of the ABA's Ten Principles of a Public De-
fense Delivery System.146 There is no doubt that prosecutors are involved in
142. See Mosteller, supra note 9, at 932 (explaining that good defense work generally
means fewer erroneous convictions).
143. See Weaver, supra note 42, at 441-44 (discussing Strickland's failure to address
the repercussion from failing to file appropriate motions due to incompetency of counsel).
144. MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 111, at 22 (noting that if an attor-
ney has 400 cases per year, he or she can allocate around six hours per case; if 1200, 2 hours;
if 2000, 70 minutes; 19,000, 7 minutes.) It must be noted that a large portion of these cases
could end up being resolved by a plea agreement that would obviously require a shorter
amount of work. In New York City, for instance, of the 177,965 new cases assigned to de-
fense counsel in the year 2000, 124,177 were "disposed of at the first appearance-most by a
plea of guilty entered after no more than a 10-minute consultation with their lawyers." Id. at
31 (internal citation omitted). This "meet and plead" practice, though freeing up precious
time for defenders, does not allow for the appropriate amount of attention to individual cases
to offer effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 31-32.
145. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 61.
146. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.
pdf [hereinafter TEN ABA PRINCIPLES]. These principles were adopted by the American Bar
Association House of Delegates in February 2002 and are meant to be recommendations for
all jurisdictions. The Ten Principles are as follows:
1. The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of
defense counsel, is independent.
2. Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public defense delivery system
consists of both a defender office and the active participation of the private bar.
3. Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is assigned and notified
of appointment, as soon as feasible after clients' arrest, detention, or request for
counsel.
4. Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a confidential space within
which to meet with the client.
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more cases than the public defenders because they are a party in the prose-
cution of every crime, not only those that involve indigent defendants.
Therefore, it is reasonable that their budgets may be larger on a raw dollar
to dollar scale.'47 The problem arises, however, when the proportion of
funding is not equal to the amount of cases both sides represent.'48 This
disproportionate funding creates an unfair advantage to the state in an ad-
versarial system such as ours, where a defendant is deemed innocent until
proven guilty.'49
5. Defense counsel's workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality re-
presentation.
6. Defense counsel's ability, training, and experience match the complexity of the
case.
7. The same attorney continuously represents the client until completion of the
case.
8. There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to re-
sources and defense counsel is included as an equal partner in the judicial system.
9. Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend continuing legal edu-
cation.
10. Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and effi-
ciency according to nationally and locally adopted standards.
Id.
147. There is research to suggest, however, that the indigent are the most prevalent
kind of defendant in criminal courts, even encompassing 90% of all criminal cases in one
jurisdiction. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 62 & n.75 (citing John Martins, Tight Re-
sources at Heart of Criminal Case Backlog, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Apr. 21, 2008, at Cl)
(discussing the disparity between the prosecutor and indigent defense attorneys in Cumber-
land County New Jersey)). More than 80% of the defendants were indigent in another juris-
diction in California. LAURENCE A. BENNER, ET. AL., SYSTEMIC FACTORS AFFECTING THE
QUALITY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION: SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO THE
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1 (2007), available at
http://www.cpda.org/publicarea/CCFAJ/Professional-Responsibility-DAs-and-
Defenders/Professional-Responsibility-DAs-and-Defenders/Supplemental%20Report%/o20
Benner.pdf. But see Heather Ratcliffe, Public Defenders Threaten to Refuse St. Louis Coun-
ty Cases, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, July 29, 2010 (citing Prosecuting Attorney Robert
McCulloch as saying that the public defenders only handle about 28% of that county's crimi-
nal cases.). Even though it is expected that prosecutors will have larger budgets, it is clear
that the gaps are wider than they should be.
148. RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 118, at 5. One of the problems with the dis-
parity in funding is that failing to provide inadequate resources for indigent defense is patent-
ly unfair when the State spends large amounts of money to prosecute defendants. Id. With-
out parity, "the defense is unable to play its role of testing the accuracy of the prosecution
evidence, exposing unreliable evidence, and serving as a check against prosecutorial or po-
lice overreaching." Id.
149. The presumption of innocence is a term attributed to the English lawyer Sir
William Garrow (1760-1840), although there is some debate as to the actual origin. See The
Meaning and Origin of the Expression: Innocent Until Proven Guilty, THE PHRASE FINDER,
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/innocent-until-proven-guilty.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2011).
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In Justice Denied, the National Right to Counsel Committee hig-
hlighted several examples of this inequity, the most shocking of which was
described in a study performed by The Spangenberg Group, which reviewed
the funding of the prosecution and the public defenders in Tennessee.'s
Even when considering only the total funds attributed to indigent prosecu-
tions in Tennessee, the study found a disparity of over $73 million between
the offices for fiscal year 2005.'"' Another study in California found that
the state's indigent defense system was "'under-funded statewide by at least
300 million dollars.""'5 2 Further, in Houston, Texas, the budget for the indi-
gent defense system there was half of the District Attorney's budget.'
These disparities are not limited to overall funding, either; the amount
of staff and compensation for the attorneys is also disproportionate.'54 In
Cumberland County, New Jersey, for instance, the public defender has half
the number of attorneys as the prosecutor, and one-seventh of the investiga-
tors.' This funding is entirely disproportionate in a county where 90% of
the cases are handled by the public defender."' However, Cumberland
County public defenders are lucky to have investigators because some indi-
gent defense attorneys have none, like those in Harris County, Texas.'
Though there is no doubt a prosecutor's office may have some need for its
own investigative unit, one must remember that the ultimate investigators-
the police-work very closely with the prosecutors to convict defendants.
The attorneys representing the defendants have no such relationship and
must rely on their own investigators to help mount a defense. Therefore, in
an office with no investigators, much of that work would likely fall to the
150. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 61 n.71 (citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,
RESOURCES OF THE PROSECUTION AND INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNCTIONS IN TENNESSEE (2007)).
151. The total prosecution budget was between $130 and $139 million dollars, while
the indigent defense budget was a mere $56.4 million. See id.
152. Id. at 61 n.73 (quoting LAURENCE A. BENNER & LORENDA S. STERN, SYSTEMIC
FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION: SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1 (2007),
available at http://www.cpda.org/publicarea/CCFAJ/Professional-Responsibility-DAs-and-
Defenders/Professional-Responsibility-DAs-and-Defenders/Supplemental%20Report/o20
Benner.pdf).
153. Id. at 62. The budget for the District Attorney's office is around $50 million,
while the county spent about $24 million on indigent defense in Houston in 2007. See Lisa
Falkenberg, An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/falkenberg/5615104.html.
154. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 62.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Falkenberg, supra note 153. While the contract attorneys who represent indigent
defendants have no investigators, the District Attorneys' office has thirty investigators on
staff. Id.
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attorneys, on top of all the other work they must do in defending their
clients."'
Moreover, in many jurisdictions, the salaries of public defenders are
well below those of prosecutors."'9 In one report, it was noted that West-
chester County, New York prosecutors made anywhere from $6,000 to
$21,000 more than their counterparts who represent the indigent defen-
dants.'" In another New York county, five part-time public defenders
earned a combined $135,000 a year, while the District Attorney's office in
that county had five full-time attorneys who earned a combined $300,000.161
A similar disparity was found in Missouri, which led to a 100% cumulative
turnover rate in one office from 2001 to 2005.162 As discussed above, in an
effort to boost morale and prevent turnover, public defenders in some juris-
dictions have chosen not to fill current vacancies in order to raise the sala-
ries of the attorneys already there."' This decision, of course, leads to a
higher caseload per attorney.'" Consequently, the supervisors are faced
with a Hobson's choice: higher caseloads and lower turnover or lower sala-
ries and higher turnover.'
158. Faced with large caseloads, it is unlikely that many attorneys would actually
take the time to do the proper investigation needed.
159. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 63.
160. Id. (citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW
YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES (2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-
commission/SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf [hereinafter KAYEREPORT]).
161. See KAYE REPORT, supra note 160, at 84. That prosecutor's office, located in
Greene County, also had a part-time attorney, whose salary is unknown. Id. At first blush, it
may appear that this disparity is justified because the public defenders are only part-time.
Those defenders, however, handled 80-85% of the criminal cases. Id. Therefore, the District
Attorneys only had about 15-20% more cases, but were compensated more than twice what
the public defenders were. Id.
162. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 63 (citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,
ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSOURI STATE PUBLic DEFENDER SYSTEM (2006)); see also Susan
McGraugh & Patricia Harrison, Public Defenders Must Give Adequate Time to Clients, ST.
Louis POST DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 2010 (arguing that the Prosecuting Attorney in St. Louis
County made an annual salary of $135,000, while the district defender, "who supervises only
slightly fewer employees, was paid $71,544 in 2009").
163. See Martinez, supra note 97; see also Florida v. Pub. Defender, 12 So. 3d 798,
805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). The Third District Court of Appeals in Florida used this fact
as an argument to deny the Public Defenders' motions to withdraw because of excessive
workload, which will be discussed infra Subsection V.A.
164. See Leckie, supra note 105. Fewer attorneys per office, combined with the
already discussed increase in cases, creates a non-linear and exponential growth in the
amount of cases each attorney receives. Id.
165. Even lead defenders who choose to hire additional attorneys face a hard time
recruiting due to low funding, high caseload burden and lack of job security. See Klein,
supra note 9, at 1474-76 (discussing how even an 80% increase in caseload did not come
with increase in attorneys, and that 60% of lead public defenders stated that increase in case
loads prevents recruiting of additional attorneys).
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E. Politics as Usual
Another factor inhibiting reform of indigent defense systems is, per-
haps surprising, the criminal defense attorneys themselves. Even though
most research points to the fact that a public defender's office is the most
cost effective way to provide for indigent defense,'" the defense bar is not
always willing or able to expedite the process of developing such a system.
In many states with an assigned counsel system, the private defense bar
depends on appointments from judges for their livelihood. This is especial-
ly true in an assigned counsel system, where an attorney is guaranteed a
certain number of appointments because he has "a Saturday tee time with
the judge."' Harris County, Texas, where Houston is located, is the largest
urban area that still employs the assigned counsel system.' Reform efforts
have all failed in this area not because the state could not pay for the new
system, but because politics ruled the day.' Even judges have fought the
change.' In March 2008, some people believed the changes were coming;
however, as of 2010, it was still politics as usual in Houston."'
Even in a jurisdiction where reform has occurred, the pushback from
the defense bar is still heavy. In Broward County, Florida, the judges used a
discretionary appointment system for assigning conflict counsel 7 2 to crimi-
nal defendants well into 2003. Because of complaints about fairness, how-
ever, the Seventeenth Circuit instituted what was commonly known as "the
wheel.""' This was a computer-generated list of available conflict counsel.
166. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 62.
167. Falkenberg, supra note 153. It has been reported that one attorney in Florida
made $567,000 per year taking assigned cases. See Jan Pudlow, Lawsuit Delays Conflict
Counsel Facilities Request, THE FLA. B. NEWS, Nov. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNnews01 .nsf/Articles/C2D2033EO99F556A85257
38B0053F333.
168. Falkenberg, supra note 153; see Cynthia Hujarr Orr & Norman Lefstein, County
Can Save Money With Public Defenders, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/editorialloutlook/6636177.html.
169. Falkenberg, supra note 153.
170. Id.
171. Chris Moran, Harris County Sweetens Public Defender Proposal, HOUS.
CHRON., July 26, 2010, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl
/metropolitan/7125943.html (discussing how Harris County (Houston) is trying to change its
system, but has not yet done so).
172. Conflict counsel is a private attorney appointed to a criminal defendant when the
public defender's office cannot represent defendant due to a conflict of interest. This occurs
when, for example, the public defender's office represents or has represented a co-defendant.
See, e.g., Administrative Order Establishing Procedure for Appointment of Counsel in Crim-
inal and Civil Proceedings and Establishment of Due Process Service Provider Rates, No.
2009-84-Gen (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2009), available at http://www.17th.flcourts.org/2009-84-
Gen.pdf.
173. Id
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The wheel was intended to rotate the number of appointments between pri-
vate bar attorneys so that no one attorney was getting a lion's share of the
appointments. This arrangement caused quite a bit of discord amongst the
private defense bar, which had come to depend on these appointments. In
2007, things became even worse for the private bar when the legislature
created a separate state-funded office to handle conflict cases.'74 This new
office, called the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel,
was not even in operation before the private bar filed a lawsuit to dismantle
it.'17 They were not successful, however, and the office still operates to-
day.176
An example of how local politics paves the way for ineffective la-
wyering can be found in the state of New York. Kimberly Hurell-Harring
was arrested for attempting to sneak marijuana to her husband in a New
York state prison.177 She was represented by Patrick Barber, who had been
awarded a contract to be the chief public defender in Washington County,
New York, simply because he submitted the cheapest bid."' This was de-
spite the fact that he had been reprimanded twice by the Committee on Pro-
fessional Standards for neglecting his cases and, according to one newspa-
per account, struggled with depression, had panic attacks, and "had daily
drinks to cope."' 79 Mr. Barber was a hometown guy, however, and had been
born and raised in the small community-a trait that no doubt helped him
get awarded the chief public defender contract.'" Because of Mr. Barber's
ineffective representation of Ms. Hurell-Harring, however, Ms. Hurell-
Harring was convicted of a felony,'"' and Mr. Barber was later disbarred due
to an unrelated matter.182
174. 2007 Fla. Laws 2010-62 (codified in FLA. STAT § 27.511 (2007)).
175. See Crist v. Fla. Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d 134, 138-39
(Fla. 2008).
176. Id. at 145-47. The Supreme Court of Florida found that this legislative creation
was not unconstitutional because these Conflict Counsel are not public defenders, and there-
fore do not need to be elected under the Florida Constitution-they are not de facto Public
Defenders. Id.
177. William Glaberson, The Right to Counsel: Woman Becomes a Test Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at MBl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/nyre
gion/21 lawyer.html.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id
181. There are reports that Mr. Barber encouraged Ms. Hurrell-Harring to plead
guilty to a felony, even though there was current litigation arguing that the crime for which
she was charged should not be considered a felony. Id
182. In re Barber, 894 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). Mr. Barber admitted to
fabricating court orders "in an effort to mislead and deceive his clients into believing he had
undertaken the tasks for which he was retained." Id. For more about Ms. Hurrell-Harring's
case, see infra Section IV.D.
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F. Budget Cuts and the Right to Counsel: An Example from Georgia
A specific illustration of how budget cuts may affect a defendant's
right to counsel may be found in a capital case in Georgia. In 2006, Jamie
Ryan Weis was arrested for the first-degree murder of Catherine King.18 3
Because this was a death penalty case, Mr. Weis was appointed two attor-
neys, Robert H. Citronberg and Thomas M. West, who were to be paid by
the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council [hereinafter "Standards
Council"].'" Representation continued for about six months, and counsel
filed motions and began to investigate Mr. Weis's case.'18  Then, in.March
2007, the attorneys filed motions asking for funds for further investigation
of the case.'8 6 Those motions were denied based on a lack of funds.'18 In
September 2007, the Standards Council stopped paying the attorneys alto-
gether.' The Director of the Standards Council, Mack Crawford, testified
that sufficient funds would not be available until June 2008, if then.' The
prosecutor'90 then moved to have public defenders from the Griffin Judicial
Circuit Public Defender's Office step in to represent Mr. Weis."' In No-
vember 2007, the Court granted this motion, relieved Citronberg and West
from their duties, and appointed the public defenders, even though the pub-
lic defenders themselves objected to the appointment.'92
Less than a month later, on December 10, 2007, the public defenders
moved to withdraw, citing workload issues as well as their clients' inability
to cooperate, but no action was taken.' On January 17, 2008, the public
defenders renewed their motion, but still no action was taken.1' In Febru-
183. Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ga. 2010).
184. Id. The Georgia Public Defender Standards Council is an independent agency
under the Georgia Executive Branch that provides counsel to indigent defendants when there
is a conflict. See GA. PUB. DEFENDER STANDARDS COUNCIL, http://www.gpdsc.com
/index.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
185. Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 353.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 359.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. The word prosecutor is italicized to emphasize that this is not a typo. The prose-
cutor even identified the public defenders by name when moving to have them appointed.
Adam Liptak, Defendants Squeezed by Georgia's Tight Budget, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at
At 3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/us/06barhtmi.
191. Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 359. Interestingly enough, the public defenders in question
here objected to the appointment, saying they were overworked as it was and could not take
on a death penalty case
192. Murder Defendant Denied Counsel, Sues Public Defenders, JD J., Jan. 3, 2009,
http://www.jdjoumal.com/2009/01/03/murder-defendant-denied-counsel-sues-public-
defenders/.
193. Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 353.
194. Id. at 359.
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ary 2008, Weis filed a pro se writ of mandamus in an attempt to force the
judge to grant the motion to withdraw and re-appoint Citronberg and
West.' No action was taken until April 25, 2008, when a stipulation was
entered that Citronberg and West would be reinstated.' 6 The reinstatement
did not actually occur, however, until February 11, 2009.'" In order for this
reappointment to happen, Weis had to agree that he would not seek any
further continuances in the case based "upon any alleged or actual lack of
funds or manpower or time to prepare said case for trial."'98
Meanwhile, the Standards Council had still not come up with adequate
funds to defend the case. As a result, Weis's attorneys filed a motion for
discharge and acquittal claiming his right to a speedy trial had been vi-
olated.'" The motion was denied,2" and the Supreme Court of Georgia af-
firmed the denial. According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Mr. Weis
was the cause of his delay.20' He should have cooperated with his public
defenders, they said, and the delay cannot be attributed to the State.202 A
writ of certiorari was filed with the United States Supreme Court, but the
high court declined to hear the case.203
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. Therefore, Mr. Weis sat in jail, unrepresented, for almost a year.
198. Id. at 354.
199. Id.
200. Interesting allegations have surfaced about the trial judge who granted the pros-
ecutors motion to force the public defenders on the case and denied the motion for discharge
filed by Citronberg and West. Judge Johnnie L. Caldwell Jr. resigned from the bench amidst
an investigation by Georgia's Judicial Qualification Commission in which a lawyer testified
Judge Caldwell offered a favorable ruling in exchange for sex. Liptak, supra note 190; see
also Alexis Stevens, DA: Deputy Caught Judge, Public Defender Having Sex, THE ATLANTA
J.-CONsT., June 11, 2010, available at http://www.ajc.com/news/fayette/da-deputy-caught-
judge-547307.html. But see Sheila A. Marshall, Judge Johnnie Caldwell Resigns, THE
GRIFFIN DAILY NEWS, Apr. 20, 2010, available at http://www.griffindaily
news.com/view/full-story/7146589/article-Judge-Johnnie-Caldwell-resigns? (quoting Cald-
well as saying, "I am 63-years-old and want time to visit with my grandkids and maybe
practice law," as his reason for retirement).
201. Weis, 694 S.E.2d. at 358.
202. The Court may be right that the delay could not be attributed to the prosecutor,
but there is certainly an argument that the delay was caused by the state and its lack of fund-
ing. The Supreme Court of Georgia did not find this persuasive, however.
203. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Weis v. State, No. 09-10715, (May 10, 2010)
available at http://standdown.typepad.com/WEIS-CertPetition-5-10-I0.pdf [hereinafter
Petition for Certiorari], cert. denied, 2010 WL 1903558 (Oct. 4, 2010). By declining to hear
the case, the Court avoided answering the question of whether this would be considered a
"systemic 'breakdown in the public defender system,"' a question left open by Vermont v.
Brillon. 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1292 (2009). In Brillon, the Court held that a defendant's speedy
trial right was not violated because the delays in the case were attributable to his and his
attorneys' actions. Id. at 1293. The actions of the defendant and his attorneys in that case
were much more egregious than those of Mr. Weis and were not a result of budgetary issues
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IV. LITIGATION AS A REMEDY
In an effort to overcome these overwhelming burdens and draw atten-
tion to the state of the right to counsel, many lawsuits have been filed across
the country." The outcomes of those suits have been mixed, with the ma-
jority not ruling in favor of the attorneys (or granting the relief they have
requested). In a recent trend, the successful lawsuits seem to be those filed
by indigent defendants themselves, rather than the attorneys who represent
them. For illustrative purposes, this Article considers lawsuits initiated in
four different states, with differing degrees of success.
A. Florida
In Miami-Dade County, where Jay Kolsky205 works, the Public De-
fender's Office [hereinafter PD- 11] filed a lawsuit asking the trial court to
"appoint other counsel in unappointed non-capital felony cases." 06 PD- I1
claimed the caseloads of its attorneys were so excessive that they were not
able to meet the needs of their clients.207 During an evidentiary hearing on
like those faced in Mr. Weis's case. Id. The questions that were presented for review in
Petitioner's Brief to the Supreme Court of the United States are below:
1. Whether a court, on motion of the prosecutor, may remove appointed counsel
who has developed an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant in
circumstances in which a retained counsel could not be removed and, if so, wheth-
er any procedural protections apply?
2. Whether leaving a poor, mentally ill man facing the death penalty virtually de-
fenseless-without counsel and without investigative and expert assistance-for
over two years between arrest and trial because the state indigent defense agency
could not pay for his representation constitutes a "systematic breakdown of the
public defender system," Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 1292 (2009), which
should be weighed against the State for speedy trial purposes?
3. Whether the denial of counsel by failing to provide resources for representation
for over two years during the critical pre-trial period and the removal of defense
counsel for a period of time on motion of the prosecutor despite an ongoing attor-
ney-client relationship, which irreparably harmed the defendant's ability to prepare
for trial, presents issues of violations of the rights to counsel and a speedy trial di-
rectly appealable under the collateral order doctrine?
Petition for Certiorari, supra, at i.
204. See Reddy, supra note 8, at 38-54 (cataloging all the lawsuits that had been filed
at the time of publication of that article).
205. Mr. Kolsky is the attorney profiled, supra notes 72-85.
206. See Motion to Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases
Due to Conflict of Interest, Florida v. Munoz, No. F08-2314 (June 24, 2008), available at
http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Motion_to Appoint OtherCounselCertifica
te of Conflict-Oscar Munoz.pdf [hereinafter Motion to Appoint Other Counsel]. The Ele-
venth Circuit referred to here is Florida's state court system.
207. In its motion, PD- 11 claimed a budget cut of $2.48 million in fiscal year 07-08
seriously undermined its ability to represent its clients. Id. at 2. The office was not able to
fill positions, and it had a high turnover rate with overworked and underpaid attorneys jump-
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the case, testimony was heard that 60% of PD- 11's caseload came from "C"
(third-degree)20 s felonies.2" The trial court agreed with PD-l l and ordered
that all "C" felonies would be assigned to the Office of Criminal Conflict
and Civil Regional Counsel for the Third District [hereinafter RRC-3].210 In
so finding, the trial court held that the PD- 11 caseload was "excessive by
any reasonable standard."211
The Office of the State Attorney in the Eleventh Circuit [hereinafter
referred to as SAO- 11],212 appealed this finding to the Third District Court
of Appeal.213 In reversing the trial court, the Third District Court of Appeal
found that there was no evidence that the caseload was "excessive by any
reasonable standard."2 4 The Third District Court of Appeal opined that
there is no "magic number of cases" that allows an attorney to competently
represent clients, and even if such a number was determined, it would cer-
tainly apply to the individual attorney, not the office as a whole.215 Fur-
thermore, the Third District found that an aggregate withdrawal based on a
conflict of interest was inappropriate.216 Instead, the trial court should de-
termine the competence of an attorney on a case-by-case basis.2 17
The Third District went on to address section 27.5303 of the Florida
Statutes, which allows public defenders to withdraw based on a conflict of
interest.218 According to the statute, the Third District opined, a public de-
ing ship. Id. The complaint continued to assert that taking on new cases would pose a con-
flict of interest to its existing clients because any additional defendants would prevent attor-
neys from providing to provide effective assistance of counsel to their current clients. Id. at
2-3, 5.
208. In Florida, third degree felonies are those that do not exceed a term of impri-
sonment of five years. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(b)-(d) (2010).
209. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Public Defender's Motion to
Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, Admin. Order No 08-14, at
4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2008), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/Order
on-motion to appoint other counsel.pdf.
210. See id. at 4-5.
211. Id. at 6. In its order, the trial court also found that further appointment of cases
to the PD-l l would create a conflict with its existing clients. Id.
212. The State Attorney is the prosecuting entity in Florida.
213. Florida v. Pub. Defender, 12 So. 3d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
214. Id. at 801-02.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 802-03.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 803-05 (citing FLA. STAT. § 27.5303 (2007)). FLA. STAT. § 27.5303(l)(a)
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
If, at any time during the representation of two or more defendants, a public de-
fender determines that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that
they cannot all be counseled by the public defender or his or her staff without con-
flict of interest . . . then the public defender shall file a motion to withdraw and
move the court to appoint other counsel.
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fender is not permitted to withdraw based merely on inadequate funding.2 19
The Third District found that because the trial court's order required PD- 11
to initially accept representation and then relinquish it after arraignment-
when it became clear the representation would be for a third degree felo-
ny-such a scheme is clearly a withdrawal and is therefore covered by the
statute. 220 The court conceded that PD-1 1's budget decreased from fiscal
year 2007-08 to fiscal year 2008-09, and that such budget constraints are
difficult.221 It did not find any correlation, however, between these budget
cuts and PD-I l's inability to handle all third-degree felony cases.222 in fact,
it found that such a withdrawal, which would amount to 60% of its cases,
would be "entirely disproportionate" to the budget cuts it suffered.223
Though it appeared that litigation would not be the basis for relief that PD-
11 thought it might be, the office has not given up. Shortly after the Third
District announced its ruling, PD-Il sought an appeal in the Supreme Court
of Florida.224 The Supreme Court of Florida recently accepted jurisdiction,
and the briefing has begun.225
In the meantime, the PD-l l office sought another avenue of attack.
Following the Third District's opinion in State v. Public Defender, Eleventh
Circuit, which held that motions to withdraw must be filed on a case-by-
case basis, one assistant public defender in PD-Il filed a motion to with-
draw and to declare the previously mentioned statute, section 27.5303, un-
constitutional.226 In considering the withdrawal, the court found the APD's
The statute goes on to read: "In no case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the
public defender or criminal conflict and civil regional counsel based solely upon
inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender or regional coun-
sel." § 27.5303(l)(d). In determining whether there is a conflict of interest, the
statute gives this guidance:
In determining whether or not there is a conflict of interest, the public defender or
regional counsel shall apply the standards contained in the Uniform Standards for
Use in Conflict of Interest Cases found in appendix C to the Final Report of the Ar-
ticle V Indigent Services Advisory Board dated January 6, 2004.
§ 27.5303(l)(e).
219. See Pub. Defender, 12 So. 3d at 806.
220. Id. at 804.
221. Id. at 805 nn. 8-9.
222. Id. at 805 ("Although PD II's budget decreased during the past fiscal year, the
record does not demonstrate any correlation between the State budget reductions and a com-
plete inability on the part of PDII to handle any third-degree felony cases.").
223. Id.
224. See Brief of Petitioner on Jurisdiction, Pub. Defender v. Florida, 2009 WL
2192596 (No. SC09-1181) (Fla. 2009).
225. See Order Accepting Jurisdiction, Pub. Defender v. Florida, 34 So. 3d 2 (Fla.
May 19, 2010) (No. SC09-1181), 2010 WL 2025545.
226. See Assistant Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw, supra note 74. This mo-
tion was filed by Jay Kolsky, the attorney profiled supra notes 72-85.
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representation of the specific client to be ineffective, and that the defendant
had suffered prejudice.227 Among other things, the trial court found that the
APD had not gotten a list of defense witnesses, had not taken any deposi-
tions in the case, had not visited the scene of the crime, and had not pre-
pared a mitigation package.228 Furthermore, the APD had to take a conti-
nuance, as he was not prepared for trial, effectively waiving his client's
right to a speedy trial.229 The court mentioned that neither section 27.5303,
Florida Statutes, nor the Third District Court of Appeal's Decision in State
v. Public Defender, Eleventh Circuit, precluded a finding in favor of the
defendant if there was actual prejudice to a defendant's constitutional
rights. 230 As a result, the trial court found the APD had made the individua-
lized showing that his client was prejudiced by this ineffective representa-
tion and, therefore, granted the motion to withdraw. 23' The trial court de-
clined to find section 27.5303 of the Florida Statutes unconstitutional,232
however, and both sides filed petitions for review in Florida's Third District
Court of Appeal.2 33
On July 7, 2010, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's order that allowed the APD to withdraw from the case.234 In a very
simple opinion, the Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial
court that a showing of actual prejudice could allow for judicial relief, but
found that such prejudice was not present in this case. 235 The court held that
227. See Order Denying Public Defender's Motion to Declare Section 27.5303(1)(d),
Florida Statutes, Unconstitutional and Granting Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw, State
v. Bowens, No. F09-019364, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/Plenary3/Workshops/Workshop3E/C Martinez-
FLW%20Bowens%200rder/20112709.pdf [hereinafter Order Denying Motion to Declare].
228. Id. at *2.
229. Id. The court also noted that due to time restrictions, arraignment conversations
with clients are within earshot of other defendants, violating the client's right to confidential-
ity, "as a result ... making it very difficult to provide meaningful assistance or begin estab-
lishing the trust necessary for an attorney-client relationship." Id.
230. Id. at *4 ("When examining the plain language of the statute, as interpreted by
the Third District . . . there exists a cognizable difference between a withdrawal based solely
on workload, and a withdrawal where an individualized showing is made that there is a sub-
stantial risk that a defendant's constitutional rights may be prejudiced as a result of the work-
load.").
231. Id.at*5.
232. Id. at *3-5.
233. See Plaintiffs Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari, State v. Bowens,
No. 3DO9-3023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/States Petition forWritofCommonLaw_
Certiorari 11 -6-09.pdf; Response-to State's Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari and
Cross Petition for Common Law Certiorari, State v. Bowens, No. 3DO9-3023 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Nov. 6, 2009), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWork
load/Response to Petition and Cross-Petition.pdf.
234. State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479, 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
235. Id at 481. According to the court:
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merely needing to file a continuance did not "rise to the threshold level of
actual prejudice." 236  Therefore, the conflict here was merely "specula-
tive." 2 37 The Third District did agree with the trial court's opinion as to the
constitutionality of the statute, however, and denied the APD's cross-
petition on that issue.238 It then certified the following question as one of
great public importance:
Whether section 27.5303(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), which prohibits a trial
court from granting a motion for withdrawal by a public defender based on "con-
flicts arising from underfunding, excessive caseload or the prospective inability to
adequately represent a client," is unconstitutional as a violation of an indigent
client's right to effective assistance of counsel and access to the courts, and a viola-
tion of the separation of powers mandated by Article II, section 3 of the Florida
Constitution as legislative interference with the judiciary's inherent authority to
provide counsel and the Supreme Court's exclusive control over the ethical rules
governing lawyer conflicts of interest?2 3 9
At first glance, this opinion seems to be another crushing blow to the
public defenders' cause, but the ultimate conclusion may work in favor of
PD-11. If the Third District had affirmed the trial court and allowed Mr.
Kolsky to withdraw, the case would presumably be transferred to the Office
of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel for the Third District [he-
reinafter referred to as RC3], the office that was supposed to receive all the
third degree felonies as a result of State v. Public Defender, Eleventh Judi-
cial Circuit.240 It should be noted that the RC3 moved to join in the appeal
to challenge the trial court's order in State v. Public Defender, Eleventh
Judicial Circuit, claiming it should not receive the appointments as contem-
plated in the trial court's order.24' Known as the "second public defender's
If the trial court's order stands, all that the PD1 1 must do to show prejudice is
swear that he or she has too many cases or that the workload is so excessive as to
prevent him or her from working on the client's case prior to the scheduled trial,
and that he or she will be forced to file for continuance, thereby waiving the
client's speedy trial rights.
Id. Unfortunately, it appears that the Third District did not give much consideration to the
findings of fact in the Eleventh Circuit, or to the ethics of the PD who filed the motion.
236. Id. at 482.
237. Id. at 481.
238. Id. at 482. The court's decision may have been influenced in light of the pend-
ing review in the Supreme Court of Florida.
239. Id.
240. 12 So. 3d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 34 So. 3d 2 (Fla.
2010).
241. Id. at 800 n.2. Interestingly enough, the RC3 did not join in the Bowens case.
See State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479, 482 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Presumably, the
office does not take issue with merely taking on one client, as opposed to a whole class of
clients; although a victory in this case would undoubtedly open the proverbial floodgates.
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office"242 in some circles, the RC3 office would no doubt be overwhelmed
by taking on all these cases, and it would not be receiving any extra funding
for these extra cases. In fact, with the prospect of adding cases to an already
strained RC3 office, it could be argued that the defendants would merely be
jumping from the proverbial frying pan to the fire. This office, also funded
by the state, has even fewer resources than PD-11. Because the RC3 office
would not be able to handle this many additional cases, a third option could
be implemented, which would be to contract the cases to private attorneys.
Though this may afford some defendants a more meaningful day in court,
the necessary funds would certainly cost Florida's taxpayers much more,
thereby causing the state to cut the PD's budgets even further, invoking a
vicious circle.243
With the certified question being presented to the Supreme Court of
Florida, however, the public defenders may actually have a better shot at a
real solution, rather than a mere band-aid. The Supreme Court of Florida
could find section 27.503 unconstitutional, which would eliminate the need
of an individualized showing of prejudice, other than an excessive caseload,
to withdraw from a case. Further, the Supreme Court of Florida would also
be poised for a holding that the legislature has failed to properly fund the
court system. If the Florida legislature was finally forced to fund the court
system properly, the benefits to all of Florida's citizens could go above and
beyond the indigent defense system.
B. Kentucky
In a strange twist of fate, on the same day that State v. Public Defend-
ers, Eleventh Judicial Circuit was decided by the Florida's Third District
Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky announced the disposition
of a similar suit by the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy [hereinaf-
ter "DPA"] .2M Unfortunately, May 13, 2009 would not be a day to celebrate
for Kentucky Public Defenders, either.
242. Gary Blankenship, FACDL Fights Regional Conflict Counsel Plan: 'We Don't
Think It's Funded Properly and Don't Think It Can Adequately Represent the Clients', FLA.
B. NEWS, June 1, 2007, at 7, available at http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi-0199-
6650255/FACDL-fights-regional-conflict-counsel.html (discussing the funding drawbacks to
SB 1088-the bill that created the RC3).
243. See David Ovalle, Miami-Dade Judge Blasts Flawed Public Defender System,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 25, 2009, available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Doc
uments/1241527326.01/1016750.html.
244. See Order, Lewis v Hollenbach, No. 2009-SC-0164-TG (Ky. May 13, 2009),
available at http://dpa.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/DF84F58C-BA3C-46F9-BFO4-CAA4172
44487/0/OrdergrantingAppellantsMotion.pdf (decided on same day as Florida's decision).
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At the beginning of the 2008-09 fiscal year, the DPA began reducing
its services in an effort to relieve its budget shortfalls. 245 The DPA stopped
providing representation in parole-revocation cases, class B misdemea-
nors,246 and involuntary-commitment orders.247 The service reduction was
short-lived, however, when a trial court ordered the office to resume servic-
es in September 2008.248 In response, the DPA filed a declaratory action in
June 2008 seeking to "clarify the legal and ethical parameters under cir-
cumstances in which defender caseloads are so high that professional re-
sponsibilities and effective assistance of counsel for poor people across
Kentucky are compromised and threatened." 249  The heart of the DPA's
claim was that it would run out of money for the fiscal year 2008-09.250
Recognizing this need, the Governor of Kentucky, Steve Beshear, provided
for an emergency allocation to the agency to keep it afloat.251 When this
allocation occurred, the executive and legislative branches of the Kentucky
245. See Burton Speakman, Public Defenders Face Budget Problems, THE DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 23, 2008, available at http://bgdailynews.com/articles
/2008/03/23/news/news8.prt (citing Kentucky Public Defender Advocate Ernie Lewis).
246. Id. In Kentucky, class B misdemeanors are those that sentence to a definite term
of imprisonment with a maximum of less than ninety (90) days. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.020(3) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation).
247. Owen Covington, Funding Shortfall 'a Dilemma', MESSENGER-INQUIRER, Jan.
28, 2009.
248. See Order, supra note 244; Motion to Dissolve or Modify Temporary Injunction,
Lewis v. Hollenbach, No. 08-CI-1094 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://dpa.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyresD160145C-7E8D-46868316893E2DADEDC/0/Motionto
ModifyTemporaryInjunction.pdf, Pleadings and Orders in Public Defender Case, KY. DEP'T
OF PUB. ADVOCACY, http://dpa.ky.gov/cilefl.htm (last updated June 26, 2009).
At the beginning of the current fiscal year, DPA reduced services in order to be
able to continue providing competent representation to as many needy clients as
possible through the entire fiscal year while still observing and complying with the
Rules of Professional Conduct as required by the Kentucky Supreme Court. How-
ever, on September 19, 2008, the Franklin Circuit Court ordered DPA to cease ser-
vice reductions and provide attorneys to all of Kentucky's indigent defendants in
all cases in which court appointments were entered. It is now estimated that DPA
will run out of money in late April or early May 2009, and then be unable to pro-
vide any representation whatsoever in any Court.
Id.
249. Pleadings and Orders in Public Defender Case, supra note 248; see also Peti-
tion for Declaratory Judgment, Lewis v. Hollenbach, No. 08-Ct- 1094 (Franklin Cir. Ct. June
30, 2008), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PD-KY-0001 -0001 .pdf.
250. See Petition for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 249, at 3-5.
251. Governor Beshear redirected $2 million from a state fund set aside to help agen-
cies offset increased costs of retirement contributions. Deborah Yetter, State 's Public De-
fenders Get $2 Million Reprieve, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Apr. 17, 2009.
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state government came together to make a motion to dismiss the lawsuit as
moot;252 the Supreme Court of Kentucky agreed and granted the motion.253
While Governor Beshear should be lauded for stepping in and helping
the DPA, it is but a temporary fix. The caseloads have seen no reduction,
and although the DPA did not have to shut its doors last year, the problems
have not been solved.254 In dismissing the suit, the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky was able to avoid answering some of the many questions raised by the
lawsuit, such as the duty of the legislature to fund the courts and the ability
of the public defenders to limit t)heir caseloads, 255 especially in death penalty
cases. 256 These questions will have to be answered soon, however, if change
is to come to the Bluegrass state.
C. Michigan
In Michigan, a different outcome in its appellate courts has paved the
way for an avenue of reform. Beginning in early 2007, the American Civil
Liberties Union filed a class action lawsuit in the Ingham County Circuit
Court on behalf of indigent defendants in three Michigan counties. 257 The
suit targeted the State of Michigan and then-Governor Jennifer Granholm in
her official capacity.258 The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the State did
not provide adequate funding to, or proper oversight of, Michigan's Indi-
gent Defense system.259 According to the lawsuit, this inadequate funding
denied the plaintiff class effective assistance of counsel.260 As relief, the
252. See Motion to Dismiss at 1, Lewis v. Hollenbach, No. 2009-SC-000164-TG (Ky.
May 13, 2009), available at http://dpa.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/6CBAD5CF-FAAO-40BD-
9104-5F4FC77CCF8 I /0/SCtMotiontoDismiss.pdf.
253. See Order, supra note 244.
254. See Presentation to Budget Review Subcommittee, KY. DEP'T OF PUB.
ADVOCACY, http://dpa.ky.gov (last updated Sept. 16, 2010) (discussing how the DPA's pro-
jected caseload for Fiscal Year 2010 is approximately 453 cases per attorney, while the more
urban areas caseloads are even higher).
255. See id.
256. See Ronnie Ellis, Conway Calls For Executions While Others Call for Morato-
rium, MCCREARY COUNTY REC., Nov. 24, 2009, available at
http://mccrearyrecord.com/statenews/x546247946/Conway-calls-for-executions-while-
others-call-for-moratorium (discussing that "50 Kentucky capital cases have received full
review by the Kentucky Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and 42 were
reversed because of serious errors").
257. See Complaint at 1, 2, 49, Duncan v. State, No. 07-000242-CZ (Ingham Cnty.
Cir. Ct. 2007), available at http://www.sado.org/fees/duncan v state.pdf. The lawsuit con-
cerned the defendants in Berrien, Genesee, and Muskegon counties. Id. at 2.
258. Duncan, 774 N.W.2d 89, 90, 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
259. See Complaint, supra note 257, at 25-36.
260. Id. at 44. The complaint is rife with specific allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 99. Some that the Court of Appeals found relevant
were:
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complaint requested that the court declare the defendants' action to be un-
constitutional and to enjoin them from such practices. 26' Further, the class
moved for the court to order the defendants to provide a proper indigent
defense program consistent with the Constitution.262
Defendants moved to summarily dispose of the lawsuit, claiming the
plaintiffs lacked standing, the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the defen-
dants were entitled to governmental immunity. 263 The trial court disagreed
with Defendants, denied their motion, and granted class certification to the
plaintiffs. 2" Defendants appealed the decision to the Michigan Court of
Appeals who affirmed the trial court's ruling.265 Although the Court of Ap-
peals decision did not rule on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, its ruling
paved the way for the plaintiffs to proceed.266 Furthermore, the court noted
[C]ounsel speaking with plaintiffs, for the first time, in holding cells for mere mi-
nutes before scheduled preliminary examinations while in full hearing range of
other inmates; counsel advising plaintiffs to waive preliminary examinations with-
out meaningful discussions of case-relevant matters; counsel failing to provide
plaintiffs with police reports; and counsel generally neglecting throughout the en-
tire course of criminal proceedings to discuss with plaintiffs the accuracy and na-
ture of the charges, the circumstances of the purported crimes, and any potential
defenses. Further alleged instances include: counsel entering into plea negotiations
without client input or approval; counsel perfunctorily advising plaintiffs to plead
guilty as charged absent meaningful investigation and inquiry; counsel improperly
urging plaintiffs to admit facts when pleas were taken; and counsel neither prepar-
ing for hearings and trials nor engaging in any communications with plaintiffs con-
cerning trials.
Id. The specific allegations from each of the plaintiffs are as follows:
Plaintiff . . . Duncan alleges that he pleaded guilty [to] an overcharged crime that
was factually unwarranted because of his attorneys [sic] inadequate representation.
Plaintiff. . . Burr . . . alleges that he had to endure a delay before an acceptable
misdemeanor plea was offered to him, which only occurred after counsel advised
him to plead guilty [to] the charged felony and after Burr demanded that counsel
speak further to the prosecutor. Plaintiff . .. Connor alleges that there was a basis
to suppress a search without a warrant that was ignored by counsel. Plaintiff ...
Taylor alleges that there existed a valid defense predicated on forensic evidence
and witness accounts had counsel bothered conducting an investigation and in-
quiry. Plaintiff . . Davila alleges that counsel failed to discuss the charges with
Davila, lied to the court about it, and failed to challenge a revision of the charges.
Plaintiffs . . . O'Sullivan, . . . Manies, and . .. Secrest allege that counsel had effec-
tively gone missing in action, despite the fact that they faced serious charges and
that hearings and trials were pending.
Id. at 132.
261. See Complaint, supra note 257, at 48.
262. Id.
263. Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 100. Defendants also maintained that the wrong parties
were sued, among other claims. Id.; U.S. CoNST. amend. XI.
264. Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 100, 145.
265. Id. at 145.
266. See id.
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that the "plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts that, if true, establish
standing, establish that the case is ripe for adjudication, and state claims
upon which declaratory and injunctive relief can be awarded."267 The court
also found that the defendants were the appropriate parties, the trial court
had jurisdiction, and the trial court also had authority to order declaratory,
prohibitory, and a certain level of mandatory injunctive relief.268
In April 2010, the suit passed one more hurdle when the Supreme
Court of Michigan approved the Court of Appeals decision and allowed the
lawsuit to go forward.269 It is unclear, at this point, what effect a positive
outcome of this lawsuit would actually have on the indigent defendants in
the state of Michigan. If the suit forces the state to properly fund the indi-
gent defense system in Michigan, however, it could have far-reaching con-
sequences.
D. New York
A similar suit has also passed scrutiny in New York. As discussed
briefly above, Kimberly Hurrell-Harring was arrested in Washington Coun-
ty, New York for trying to sneak marijuana to her husband, an inmate in a
state prison.270 Pressured by her court-appointed lawyer, Ms. Hurrell-
Harring pleaded guilty and was convicted of a felony.271 Her case was no-
ticed by the New York Civil Liberties Union, which then filed suit on her
behalf, as well as nineteen other defendants in five New York counties.272
In their suit, the plaintiffs allege many of the same complaints found
in similar suits around the country. There are allegations of excessive ca-
267. Id. at 98.
268. Id. at 107.
269. Duncan v. State, 780 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Mich. 2010) [hereinafter Duncan II].
The Supreme Court of Michigan did not comment on the merit of any of the claims and
merely entered a summary order affirming the Court of Appeals. The court did give some
hint as to its reasoning when it said: "[t]his case is at its earliest stages and, based solely on
the plaintiffs' pleadings in this case, it is premature to make a decision on the substantive
issues. Accordingly, the defendants are not entitled to summary disposition at this time." Id.
270. Glaberson, supra note 177. See more discussion of this case supra Section III.E.
271. Id. According to Ms. Hurrell-Harring's court-appointed attorney, Patrick Bar-
ber, he and four other part-time defenders juggle 1,661 cases appointed to them. See Debo-
rah Hastings, Public Defenders, and Defendants, Feel the Squeeze, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, June 13, 2009, available at http://www2.timesdispatch.com
/lifestyles/2009/jun/13/i-defeO6O4 20090611-213005-ar-40477/. Other reports of Mr. Bar-
ber have not been so favorable, however. See Glaberson, supra note 177; supra Section
W.E.
272. The Counties are: Onondaga, Ontario, Schuler, Suffolk and Washington. See
Amended Class Action Complaint, Hurrell-Harring v. State, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5479
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/Amended%20Class
%20Action%20Complaint.pdf.
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seloads, lack of training, lack of funding, lack of supervision, etc.273 Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, all of these situations have led to the complete
breakdown of the indigent defense system in five counties in New York and
have deprived the plaintiffs of their right to counsel.274 In support, the plain-
tiffs frequently cited to a recent report regarding the status of indigent de-
fense in New York, referred to here as the "Kaye Report." 275 The plaintiffs
asked the trial court to enter an order declaring that the plaintiffs' rights
were being violated, as well as to enjoin the state of New York to overhaul
the system so as to comply with the state and federal constitutions.276
The State moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the re-
medies sought were not justiciable.277 Namely, the State alleged that each of
the plaintiffs could pursue their action via ineffective assistance of counsel
motions in their individual criminal cases.278 Further, the State argued that
the named plaintiffs did not have standing to assert the constitutional viola-
tions on behalf of future indigent defendants. 279 The State also asserted that
the proper avenue to pursue the implementation of the Kaye Report was in
the legislature, not the courts. 280 The trial court granted the motion to dis-
miss for the reasons articulated by the State, but the intermediate appellate
273. The Complaint alleges that the New York's failure to provide a proper indigent
defense system harms plaintiffs in myriad ways. Some of the harms suffered include:
wrongful denial of representation; unnecessary or prolonged pretrial detention; ex-
cessive or inappropriate bail determinations, which have been shown [to] increase
the likelihood of conviction; waiver of meritorious defenses; guilty pleas to inap-
propriate charges; guilty pleas taken without adequate knowledge and awareness of
the full, collateral consequences of the pleas; wrongful conviction of crimes;
harsher sentences than the facts of the case warrant and few alternatives to incarce-
ration; and waiver of the right to appeal and other post-conviction rights.
Id. at 5.
274. See, e.g., id. Even though the complaint centers on five counties, it does state
that these inadequacies are not limited to those counties. Those are just the counties where
the plaintiffs are from, and are therefore the subject of the suit. See id.
275. In 2004, Chief Judge of the State of New York, Judith S. Kaye, commissioned a
group to study the indigent defense system in New York. The group, called the New York
Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services, issued its report in June 2006. In its
detailed report, the Commission found that the state of New York "is currently failing to
provide a substantial number of indigent defendants with adequate and meaningful represen-
tation as required by the state and federal constitutions and the laws 6f New York State."
THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF
JUDGE KAYE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES vi (2006) [herei-
nafter KAYE REPORT], available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-
commission/SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf.
276. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 272, at 103.
277. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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court reversed.28 ' The State then appealed to New York's court of last
resort,282 the Court of Appeals, where a more favorable ruling for indigent
defendants occurred.
The Court of Appeals denied the State's motion to dismiss, allowing
the case to proceed.283 In its opinion, New York's highest court disputed
that the State's allegation in this case was merely an ineffective representa-
tion issue. Instead, the court held that the issue was one of Sixth Amend-
ment deprivation of counsel and was therefore cognizable in a civil action
of the sort brought by Plaintiffs. As the court explained, "[t]he questions
properly raised in this Sixth Amendment-grounded action, we think, go not
to whether ineffectiveness has assumed systemic dimensions, but rather to
whether the State has met its foundational obligation under Gideon to pro-
vide legal representation."284
As to the second question, whether this is an issue within the purview
of the legislature and not the courts, the Court of Appeals countered that
claim with one of the oldest constitutional doctrines, that of judicial re-
view.285 Plaintiffs' claim that they are being deprived of a constitutional
right was certainly justiciable in the courts, according to the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, just as it was justiciable in Gideon.286 Even if a remedy
would require the "reordering of legislative priorities,"2 8 7 according to the
court, it is the essential obligation of the judiciary to correct a "violation of a
fundamental constitutional right."288 In concluding its opinion and reinstat-
ing the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reminded us that "Gideon 's guarantee
to the assistance of counsel does not turn upon a defendant's guilt or inno-
cence, and neither can the availability of a remedy for its denial."289
E. What Do These Lawsuits Tell Us?
When comparing these lawsuits, the most notable difference between
the successful lawsuits and the unsuccessful lawsuits lies in who the plain-
281. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
282. The Court of Appeals is New York's highest appellate court. See STATE OF NEW
YORK, COURT OF APPEALS, http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
283. Hurrell-Harring, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
284. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 221-22 (N.Y. 2010) [hereinafter Hur-
rell-Harring II].
285. Id. at 227 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803)).
286. Id. "There is no argument that what was justiciable in Gideon is now beyond the
power of a court to decide." Id. "There is no dispute that both our Federal and State Consti-
tutions guarantee the right to counsel to all criminal defendants where loss of liberty is at
stake and, where a defendant is unable to retain an attorney, require that the state provide
counsel." Hurrell-Harring, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
287. Hurrell-Harring II, 930 N.E.2d at 227.
288. Id (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137).
289. Id.
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tiffs are. Public defenders bringing suit, while perhaps garnering some
sympathy from the courts, have not actually prevailed.2" On the other hand,
when the plaintiffs are the indigent defendants themselves, 291' and, therefore,
are those who have presumably suffered the constitutional violation, the
courts seem much more likely to at least let the lawsuit survive. The down-
side to such suits, however, is the lack of general effect they may have on
the criminal justice system. Although they may generate relief for some
individual defendants, it is unlikely that they can affect the kind of change
necessary to make a difference in the indigent defense system as a whole.
V. WHY THIS PROBLEM NEEDS TO BE SOLVED
This Article has shown that the problem of non-representation of indi-
gents still exists today, possibly more so than it did before Gideon. Al-
though lawsuits are one way to remedy the problem, a larger systemic
change needs to occur. A question remains, however, as to what remedy
can be employed today, in a time when the economy is worse than ever.
Some critics would say, after all, these are criminals, the dregs of society.
Why should we afford them protection when schools are losing teachers and
policemen and firefighters are losing their jobs? Why should those accused
of crime be a top concern?
One of the most obvious reasons is that the Constitution says so.292
Gideon and its progeny mandate that all indigent defendants be provided
effective counsel, and this Article shows that many are not being provided
with this fundamental constitutional right. We do not want to fall further
into the abyss of having a system of justice where only the rich can defend
themselves. Cases in the news from O.J. Simpson 293 to Dont6 Stallworth 294
290. See Kentucky and Florida cases discussed supra Subsections IV.A., IV.B.
291. This also applies to those who are represented by a national interest group such
as the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers, America Civil Liberties Union, etc., such as Hurrell-Harring (represented by
the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation) and Duncan (represented by American
Civil Liberties Union).
292. See supra notes 10-22.
293. Mr. Simpson was accused of killing his ex-wife and her friend Ron Goldman.
See http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAGl005334/index.htm The
civil suit can be found at Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
The judge presiding at the civil trial was Hiroshi Fujisaki.
294. Brian Kapur, Cooperative Stallworth Gets 30 Days; DUI Plea Criticized, USA
TODAY, June 17, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/browns
/2009-06-15-stallworth-dui-caseN.htm?csp-34. Though convicted of DUI manslaughter,
Stallworth received only thirty days in jail. Chuck Hurley, CEO of Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD), was not happy with the settlement. "MADD is profoundly disappointed
in the outcome of the Stallworth settlement," Hurley said in a statement. "MADD will not
accept any monies from the settlement. This is a clear test of the NFL's continued tolerance
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highlight the belief that if you have enough money, you can buy justice.
America was founded on the principle that justice should be provided for
all, not only those who can afford it.
Further, our system is based on the belief that all defendants are inno-
cent before proven guilty. In fact, more and more evidence surfaces every
day to show us that the system convicts innocent people more often than we
are aware.2 95 The crisis in funding for public defenders is likely to exacer-
bate this problem. If a public defender has only hours to work on the enti-
rety of a case, how is he to distinguish those clients who are truly innocent
from those who merely claim they are?296
Additionally, most Americans believe in a system of public defense.2 97
In a survey conducted by the National Committee on the Right to Counsel,
it was found that "88 [%] of Americans believe that the quality of justice a
person receives should not be determined by how much money he or she
has."2 98 Further, 94% of Americans "believe it is important for low-income
defendants to be represented by attorneys with small enough caseloads to
provide the time necessary to prepare a defense." 2" Almost 60% believe
this should be a guaranteed right.3"
Finally, providing competent counsel to indigent defendants could ac-
tually save the states much needed resources. It is possible that fewer inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims would be filed, freeing up time for
prosecutors to focus on prosecuting crime. There would also likely be few-
er appeals. Further, defendants would most likely receive lighter sentences
if their defenses were actually investigated and handled correctly, instead of
being shuffled off to jail on plea agreements. In turn, this would serve as a
reduction in the states' burden of housing these prisoners in jail.
VI. WHAT WE CAN DO TO BRING GIDEON BACK To LIFE
So, now having established that it should be fixed-how do we go
about accomplishing that goal? In a way, the economy may be a blessing in
of drunk driving. We are closely watching what the NFL does." See id. The same article
also discusses Atlanta Falcons quarterback Michael Vick, who was sentenced to two years in
prison after he pleaded guilty to federal dogfighting charges, and Leonard Little of the Rams,
who received only an eight-game suspension from the NFL after he pled guilty to involunta-
ry manslaughter for hitting and killing a woman while he was driving drunk. Id.
295. See Mosteller, supra note 9.
296. Id.
297. Nat'l Comm. on the Right to Counsel, Facts and Figures, NAT'L LEGAL AID &
DEFENDER Ass'N (2004), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderKit
/facts#howfunded [hereinafter NLDA FACTS AND FIGUREs].
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id
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disguise, forcing us to make big changes in how we prosecute crime-
changes we may not have chosen to undertake without facing such financial
dire straits. The three suggestions below may not be heralded by prosecu-
tors and law enforcement officers at first glance, but in reality, these sugges-
tions would not only help those who represent the indigent accused of
crimes, but would also bring needed relief to law enforcement agencies as
well.
A. Abandon the Tough-on-Crime Mentality
We have long fostered the idea in this country that being "tough on
crime" is a way to curtail the criminal acts and help form a more peaceful
society. Such a belief has its origins in some of the more conservative pres-
idential administrations, beginning with President Nixon.30 ' In 1970, one in
every 400 Americans was incarcerated.302 Today, that number has qua-
drupled, with nearly one in every 100 adults being incarcerated, more than
in any other affluent country.303 America has five times more people incar-
cerated than in Britain, nine times more than Germany, and twelve times
more than Japan.3
Part of the increase in prison populations is directly related to the war
on drugs.30 Over the past thirty years, stricter drug laws and tougher sen-
tences for drug offenses have contributed to a much larger prison popula-
tion.306 The number of people in prison for drug crimes has increased from
40,000 in 1980, to 500,000 today.3"' This wave of incarceration has swept
up many unintended victims in its wake. One example is Richard Pacy, a
disabled man convicted of drug trafficking because he had exactly the
amount of medicine he was prescribed.30 s Mr. Paey is a car accident victim
301. Adam Liptak, Right and Left Join Forces on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/us/24crime.html.
302. Rough Justice In America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, THE
ECONOMIST, July 22, 2010, at 26 [hereinafter Rough Justice].
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. As far back as 1986, Professor Wisotsky opined that the war on drugs was futile
and a drain on our law enforcement system. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE
IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 8 (1986); STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS:
OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC POLICY 8 (1990).
306. While the number of people imprisoned for violent crime has decreased 28%,
non-violent offenders being imprisoned rose 189%. See Rough Justice, supra note 302, at
29.
307. Marc Mauer, Tough Sentencing Harder on Budgets Than on Crime, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, June 7, 2009, at DI; see also, Robert G. Lawson, Drug Law Reform-
Retreating from an Incarceration Addiction, 98 KY. L.J. 201, 201 (2010).
308. Daniel Schorn, Prisoner Of Pain: How One Man's Quest For Pain Relief
Landed Him In Jail, CBS NEWS, Jan. 29, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/sto
ries/2006/01/25/60minutes/mainl238202.shtml?tag-contentMain;contentBody; see also,
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who is confined to a wheelchair and suffers from multiple scleroris.309 As a
result, Mr. Paey endures an excruciating amount of pain each day.3"o In
order to ease that pain, Mr. Paey takes a large amount of Vicodin, Percocet,
and other medications.3 " The more he takes those medicines, the more his
body builds up a tolerance to them, and the more painkillers he has to ingest
to get any relief.3 12 The large amount of prescriptions filled by Mr. Paey
caught the eye of law enforcement agents, who were convinced Mr. Paey
was selling the painkillers."' He was arrested, tried, and convicted of drug
trafficking.314 Because of the mandatory minimum sentencing scheme in
Florida, the judge had no choice but to sentence Mr. Paey to twenty-five
years in prison." Mr. Paey served four years of that sentence before Flori-
da Governor Charlie Crist granted him a full pardon." 6 Mr. Paey still proc-
laims he never sold one pill and sat in prison for four years for a crime he
did not commit."'
Another problem with the over incarceration of drug crimes is the al-
most inevitable recidivism of incarcerated prisoners. Today, two-thirds of
released prisoners are expected to be rearrested within three years of re-
lease." A first-time drug offender may receive a light sentence the first
time, but, when released, the chances are high that he or she will go back to
using drugs or alcohol and be rearrested. If not rearrested on new charges,
these offenders may be out on parole, and many are sent back to prison for
parole violations. Interestingly enough, in one state, it was found that 60%
of parole violations were a result of the parolee using alcohol or drugs, or
merely failing to report to their parole officer."' Many of those then rear-
rested are subject to even harsher sentences based on laws designed to deter
repeat offenses.320 These victimless crimes are creating a vicious circle of
John Tierney, Punishing Pain, July 19, 2005, N.Y TIMES, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/19/opinion/19tiemey.html?_r-l1&oref-slogin; Radley
Balko, Richard Paey Speaks: An Interview with the Paraplegic Man Sentenced to 25 Years
in Prison for Treating His Own Pain, REASON MAG., Nov. 20, 2007, available at
http://reason.com/archives/2007/l1/20/richard-paey-speaks.
309. Schorn, supra note 308.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id
316. Balko, supra note 308.
317. Id. Ironically, Mr. Paey received the most relief from his pain while he was in
prison, where the State paid for a constant morphine drip directly into his spine. Id.
318. Mauer, supra note 307.
319. Id. ("In Kansas, for example, 60% of admissions to prison had consisted of
parolees who had been using drugs or alcohol or who failed to report to their parole offic-
er.").
320. Rough Justice, supra note 302, at 26, 29.
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incarceration that overburdens and drains the resources of the states. At an
average annual cost of $25,000321 per prisoner, the incarceration of these
drug offenders is costing the states $12.5 billion dollars a year.3 22 If this
money were to be divided amongst the fifty states, each state would see a
windfall of $230 million per year.32  This money could then be used to
combat violent crime and create more diversion programs that would actual-
ly help stop the cycle of incarceration that has become so prevalent. Of
course, this money could also be used to help fund a failing indigent defense
system.3 24
Some critics argue that these harsher penalties help deter crime and
have a direct result on the falling crime rate.325 While no one denies that the
crime rate has dropped, one study shows that for every 10% increase in the
number of people in jail, the crime rate would only be reduced by half of
1%.326 Is this over-incarceration worth it? Most Americans actually do not
think so. In fact, the attitudes of most Americans have changed dramatical-
ly over the past fifteen years with regard to crime and punishment.2 7 In a
survey conducted in 2006, more than half of those asked believed that alter-
native sentencing should "often" be employed over incarceration for non-
violent offenders.3 28 Additionally, the public seems to be dissatisfied with
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes that take away the discretion of
judges.329 Furthermore, more than 75% of the people believe that sentenc-
ing reform is needed.330
Fighting crime is most certainly an important societal goal, but the
balance between fighting crime and the resources afforded to those accused
of committing crimes is unequal in today's society. We have increased the
likelihood of being accused of a crime with the imposition of harsh drug
laws, yet we have made it much harder to defend oneself against such an
321. This number is derived by multiplying 50,000 (number of prisoners incarcerated
for drug crimes) by 25,000 (cost to states per prisoner per year). Some estimates are even as
high as $50,000 per prisoner, per year in California, which would make the total amount of
money spent on incarcerating prisoners considerably larger. Id. at 29.
322. Mauer, supra note 307.
323. Based on calculations of 460,000 x 25000 = 11,500,000,000 / 50 = 230,000,000.
324. Klein, supra note 9, at 1439.
325. Rough Justice, supra note 302, at 28.
326. Id. at 29.
327. See PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH AssoCs. INT'L FOR THE NAT'L CTR. STATE
COURTS, NCSC SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY (2006), available at http://www.ncscon
line.org/D_Research/Documents/NCSCSentencingSurveyReportFinal060720.pdf [herei-
nafter NCSC SURVEY].
328. Id at 5.
329. Id. at 6. The survey found that 56% of Americans believe that judges should
have more leeway in sentencing. Id
330. Id. at 7. Over a quarter of those surveyed believed that major change is needed.
Id.
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accusation. This appears fundamentally unfair and inapposite to the system
of justice upon which our country was founded.
B. Misdemeanor Reform
Another way to find more money for state budgets-and free up pub-
lic defenders-is to reform the misdemeanor system as it currently exists in
this country. Right now, the misdemeanor system is a "black hole for jus-
tice and resources.""' Misdemeanor prosecutions have more than doubled
in the last thirty years, going from five million in 1972 to 10.5 million in
2006.332
Much of the reason for the rise in misdemeanor cases is the over-
criminalization of so many offenses.333 Some examples of offenses now
classified as "crimes" include sleeping in a cardboard box,334 occupying
more than one seat on the subway," and feeding the homeless.336 Other
offenses that tend to clog the misdemeanor courts are those related to driv-
er's licenses. The charge of driving with a suspended license ("DWLS")
consumed 41% of the cases heard in one misdemeanor court in Washington
State on the day of a site visit from the writers of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") report, "Minor Crimes, Massive
Waste."337 The prevalence of these charges is due to the ease in which a
person can pick up a DWLS charge. Many people have their license sus-
pended for failing to pay a fine or failure to appear in court, and many times
this suspension is done in absentia, so the defendant does not even know the
license has been suspended until he or she is arrested for the offense.338
Many of these defendants fail to pay their fines because they simply cannot
afford it, particularly in these tough economic times. And if they cannot
331. See Tim Klass, Study Finds 'Massive Waste' in Misdemeanor Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009 (quoting John Wesley Hall, president of National Association of Crim-
inal Defense Lawyers).
332. MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 111, at 11.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 25 (citing Betancourt v. Bloomberg, 448 F.3d 547, 554 (2nd Cir. 2006)
(upholding arrest for sleeping in a cardboard box against constitutional vagueness chal-
lenge)).
335. Id at 25 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21 § 1050.7 (2010)).
336. Id (citing In Orlando, a Law Against Feeding Homeless-and Debate Over
Samaritans' Rights, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/04/america/NA-FEA-GEN-US-Do-Not-Feed-the-
Homeless.php.
337. MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note I11, at 25-26. Another 21% of the
cases were minors in possession of alcohol, making more than 60% of the misdemeanor
cases in the Lower Kittias District Court that day either DWLS or minor in possession of
alcohol. Id.
338. Id.; see also discussion infra notes 347-49 regarding the King County, Washing-
ton diversion program.
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afford to pay a traffic ticket, they probably cannot afford to pay an attorney
and, therefore, turn to the public defender.
The idea that many offenses are over-criminalized is not merely a lib-
eral inspiration. There is a rising consensus from both the right and left that
the criminal justice system needs massive reform, and there are too many
laws criminalizing minor acts.3 "9 Even Edwin Meese, former attorney gen-
eral under Ronald Reagan, has spoken publicly about the rise of criminal
offenses.340 As discussed supra, much of the caseload burden in public de-
fenders' offices stems from this rising misdemeanor caseload. 341' Decrimi-
nalizing many of these offenses would free the public defenders offices to
represent those who are accused of serious crime, allowing for a more tho-
rough defense.34 2 Additionally, decriminalizing them would save the states
millions of dollars.343
339. Liptak, supra note 301. Although both sides tend to agree that reform is needed,
the reasons for the reform are at odds. The conservatives, for example, believe that the crim-
inal justice system has become so over encompassing of crimes because of the liberal ten-
dency to promote "big government." Id. The liberals, on the other hand, blame the conserv-
ative war on drugs. HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS
TARGET THE INNOCENT 45-47 (2009). According to Mr. Silverglate, the federal laws are so
"comprehensive and vague that all Americans violate it every day, meaning prosecutors can
indict anyone at all." Liptak, supra (citing SILVERGLATE, supra, at xxx-xxxi).
340. Liptak, supra note 301 ("There are ... more than 4400 criminal offenses in the
federal code," according to the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in which Mr.
Meese is a fellow. The foundation takes issue with the fact that many of these offenses do
not require the prosecutors to prove any kind of criminal intent.); see also SILVERGLATE,
supra note 339, at xxxi. It must be noted that the conservative criticism of the justice system
comes at a time when many prominent businessman are being prosecuted for financial deal-
ings, no doubt influencing this new-found criticism.
341. See MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 111, at 26-28.
342. Logic follows that a more thorough defense would also result in fewer ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims and possibly more dismissal of charges if they were tho-
roughly investigated. Furthermore, it would also free the prosecutors from having to litigate
these cases and allow them to focus on the bigger, more important crimes.
343. See MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 111, at 27-30. The authors
make four recommendations that would help ease the caseload problem in misdemeanor
courts:
1. Offenses that do not involve a significant risk to public safety should be decri-
minalized.
2. Diversion programs should be expanded.
3. Funding for misdemeanor defense should permit the maintenance of appropri-
ate caseloads.
4. Counties and states should discontinue the use of flat-fee contracts as a means
of providing indigent defense services.
Id.
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Recognizing this need, some states have begun this process. In Ha-
waii, for example, the State legislature passed an act that required a non-
partisan research group "to identify minor criminal offenses for which typi-
cally only a fine is imposed and which may be decriminalized without un-
dermining the ability of government to enforce laws within its jurisdic-
tion."3" Following the recommendation of the group, the Hawaii legislature
decriminalized a host of agricultural, conservation-related, transportation,
and boating offenses.345 In Massachusetts, the citizens of the state voted to
decriminalize possession of small quantities of marijuana; and in Nebraska,
the public defender has recommended the decriminalization of various dog
leash and trespass offenses.3"
Another recommendation by a major study is to expand diversion pro-
grams.347 King County, Washington has such a program for those whose
license has been suspended.348 Under the guidelines of that program, the
defendant can pay the fines associated with the suspended license through
community service or work crew. If the person completes the program, the
prosecutor dismisses any associated charges. When the program was stu-
died in 2004, it was found that the diversion program allowed for an 84%
reduction in prosecuting filings of DWLS and a 24% reduction in jail costs,
with 1,330 fewer jail days. Further, the study found that the program ac-
tually generated twice as much revenue as it cost.3 49 Because there would
be no possible jail time associated with these charges, the states would not
be required to assign counsel to the defendants. If other jurisdictions follow
the lead of states such as Hawaii and Washington and choose to decriminal-
ize many of these petty offenses, there would be fewer charges for public
defenders to defend. This would free up the precious time of public defend-
ers to spend representing those charged with serious crimes.
344. Id. at 27. After undertaking the research, the group found that in Hawaii:
numerous criminal offenses remain on the books outside the Penal Code that are
routinely disposed of by a fine but which, because they are technically criminal,
require at least one court appearance and all of the time and expense that goes with
it. Some of these are traffic offenses but many are offenses that have become ar-
cane, sometimes perceived as being irrelevant with the passage of time.
Id. (quoting Edwin L. Baker, Decriminalization of Nonserious Offenses: A Plan of Action,
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, Report No. 3 (2005), available at
http://www.state.hi.us/lrb/rpts05/decrim.pdf).
345. Id. (citing S.B. 2400, 24th leg. (Haw. 2008), available at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2008/Bills/SB2400 CDI.pdf).
346. Id. at 28.
347. See id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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C. Prosecutorial Discretion
Though statutory reform is a start, prosecuting agencies must also play
their part by employing more prosecutorial discretion.so One Philadelphia
prosecutor has embraced this idea.' R. Seth Williams took over the job as
the new district attorney in crime-ridden Philadelphia in January 2010. One
of the first things on his agenda was to get "smart on crime," instead of
tough on crime. In following his word, Mr. Williams downgraded penalties
for possessing small amounts of marijuana from jail time to community
service and fines.352 Even more important are the changes Mr. Williams is
making in the unit that decides what charges to file.353 That unit previously
consisted of five lawyers, mostly new prosecutors, who were told to file
"the widest and harshest charges they could."'354 This idea of "throwing
everything at the wall and seeing what sticks" is prevalent amongst many
prosecuting offices.355 Under Mr. Williams' administration, however, the
unit has been increased to eighteen lawyers who are told to spend time con-
sidering what charges will be likely to succeed. They have also been autho-
rized to offer more plea bargains earlier in the process.356
Although the outward motivation of Mr. Williams may be to obtain
more successful convictions, his philosophy is one that will have far-
reaching effects. If minor drug crimes result in only community service and
fines, drug addicts are kept out of jail and better able to get help dealing
with their addictions. Furthermore, if the office is more selective about the
charges it brings, public defenders are liberated to represent those accused
of more serious crimes. It will be interesting to see how this new idea plays
out in Philadelphia. Hopefully, it will attract the attention of other prosecut-
350. In the report MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, the writers observed public de-
fenders preparing to try a solicitation of alcohol case that apparently involved "an exotic
dancer accused of improperly soliciting a patron to purchase an alcoholic beverage." Id. at
26.
351. Erik Eckholm, 'Smart on Crime' Mantra of Philadelphia Prosecutor, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010
/06/20/us/20philly.html?_r-1.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-
Based Ceiling, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1237, 1254 (2008) ("[P]rosecutors can be expected to, and do
routinely, overcharge simply because overcharging gives prosecutors bargaining leverage.").
356. Eckholm, supra note 351. Much of the motivation behind this shift in ideals
stems from the failure of the office to successfully convict many violent criminals. In fact,
an investigative report done by the Philadelphia Inquirer found that the city "failed to obtain
convictions in two-thirds of cases involving violent crimes" in the city. The report also
found that "thousands of cases were dismissed because prosecutors were not prepared or
witnesses did not appear." Id.
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ing offices across the country, and Mr. Williams's approach will herald the
beginning of a new philosophy in criminal justice.
CONCLUSION
Although the litigation discussed above is one way to bring attention
to the plight of the indigent in this country, such litigation is not likely to
bring about the changes that are needed in the criminal justice system. For
one thing, much of the litigation surrounding this issue seems to be reaching
a dead end. There is some hope with the lawsuits filed in Michigan and
New York, and most recently in Missouri,"' but much of this litigation is
focused on particular defendants. Additionally, a victory for the public de-
fender in these cases may relieve the attorneys of some of their burden, but
it could very well leave the indigent defendants with no one to represent
them. To truly make a meaningful difference in the way the indigent are
afforded their guaranteed right to counsel, fundamental reform is needed.
It is unrealistic to believe that all three of the reforms in this Article
will happen forthwith. There is still much debate and opposition from the
public, as well those involved in the criminal justice system."' In a time
when schools and hospitals are facing major budget shortfalls, it is hard to
get public support behind a reform to help the indigent accused of a
crime."' Accordingly, the public must be educated as to why the reforms
discussed here would be beneficial for not only those accused of crime, but
357. Amidst complaints of underfunding, public defenders in Missouri began refusing
to accept new cases in July 2010. See Kathryn Wall, Suspect's Case on Hold, Caught in
Public Defender Case Overload, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN, Sept. 6, 2010, available at
http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2010/09/06/suspect-caught-public-defender-
caseload. Despite this refusal, a trial court appointed the public defenders to defendant Jared
Blacksher's case. Id. The Missouri Public Defender Commission sought a writ of prohibi-
tion in the Missouri Supreme Court, and the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on Sep-
tember 3, 2010. See Preliminary Writ of Prohibition, In re State ex. rel. Mo. Pub. Defenders
Comm'n, No. SC91150 (Mo. Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://graphics8.nytim
es.com/packages/pdf/ScanOOI.PDF. Though this was obviously not a substantive ruling, the
fact that the Missouri Supreme Court did not deny the petition outright is a victory for the
public defenders.
358. See Davey, supra note 104. In response to complaints from Missouri public
defenders about their workload and lack of resources, one prosecutor has said, "[t]hey just
need to suck it up and get out there and get it done." Id.
359. See Weaver, supra note 42, at 445 ("In the best of times, because criminal de-
fendants are not popular with the public, there is no political will to revamp the system or to
give significant budgetary increases to indigent defense. This is especially true today when
the states face massive budget deficits, and they are being forced to cut more popular items
such as health care and education. Under such circumstances, it is hard to believe that
elected leaders are prepared to revamp the system of indigent representation or to provide
significant funding increases. It is equally inconceivable that the United States Supreme
Court will mandate such a revamping.").
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also for society at large. At least two of the suggestions discussed in this
Article would conform to that requirement. Reforming the misdemeanor
system would not necessarily benefit hardened career criminals, but would
help to alleviate some of the backlog in traffic courts. Instituting diversion
programs, like the one in place in King County, Washington, 360 would still
penalize traffic violators, but would have the added benefit of those viola-
tors contributing to society through community service and labor in work
crews. Although abandoning tough on crime and the war on drugs would
appear to be a tougher sell to the public, recent polls suggest that Ameri-
can's attitudes are changing in this regard. 6 ' Consequently, the time may
have come to begin a true shift in the paradigm of our justice system.
Regardless of whether litigation or the recent attention to this crisis
forces the states to make any real changes immediately, the states need to
examine their treatment of indigent criminal defendants and find a way to
truly honor the Gideon decision. Although Gideon's trumpet has been
muted, its volume must be raised so the criminal justice system can hear the
plight of the indigent in America's criminal justice system. As Robert Ken-
nedy so eloquently stated: "The poor man charged with a crime has no lob-
by. Ensuring fairness and equal treatment in criminal trials is the responsi-
bility of us all."362
360. See discussion supra, Section VII.B.
361. See discussion supra, Section VH.A.
362. Ken Armstrong & Justin Mayo, Frustrated Attorney: 'You Just Can't Help
People', Apr. 6, 2004, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
news/local/unequaldefense/stories/three.
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